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RE-INTERPRETING POSTVILLE:
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
SIOBAN ALBIOL
R. LINUS CHAN
SARAH J. DIAZ*
Any [immigration] reform plan has to recognize
the economic realities that bring people across
sometimes deserts or oceans to come into this
country in order to do work .... that can't be
filled, and that the people who are doing that
work have to be afforded a level of humanitarian
protection and fairness that prevents them from
being victimized ....
I also have to say, it gives me no joy to see televi-
sion images of crying children, or people who are
working here illegally but otherwise not harming
the country or doing anything wrong, being fright-
ened and being removed for enforcement reasons
that are completely legitimate, but nevertheless,
painful on [a] human basis.1
* Sioban Albiol, Director, DePaul University College of Law Asylum & Im-
migration Clinic; R. Linus Chan, Clinical Instructor, DePaul University Col-
lege of Law Asylum & Immigration Clinic; Sarah J. Diaz, Clinical Instructor,
DePaul University College of Law Asylum & Immigration Clinic.
1 Michael Chertoff, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the Anti-
Defamation League's 29th Annual Leadership Conference (May 1, 2007),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp-1178115258693.shtm.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has seen a dramatic increase in worksite
enforcement operations over the last few years.2 One of the
largest worksite enforcement operations in United States history
occurred on May 12, 2008 in Postville, Iowa. United States Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the federal agency
responsible for interior enforcement of immigration laws, raided
Agriprocessors, Inc., the largest kosher meatpacking plant in the
United States and the largest employer in Postville, Iowa. Dr.
Erik Camayd-Freixas, a federally certified interpreter con-
tracted to interpret for the court proceedings, provided a first-
person account shedding light on this "man-made disaster" that
fast-tracked the arrested workers into accepting criminal
charges, convictions and deportation, deprived workers of
meaningful access to justice, imposed criminal penalties for of-
fenses normally viewed as civil in nature, separated parents
from children, and economically devastated Postville. Collateral
damages are ongoing. Dr. Camayd-Freixas's article details as-
pects of the proceedings, which were largely kept secret even
after prosecution had begun.3 Still, nearly a year later, some of
the actions taken by parties to the proceedings remain unknown
and unanswered.
2 ICE enforcement actions increased sevenfold between 2002 and 2006. See
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, TRACKING ICE's ENFORCEMENT AGENDA 4
(2007), available at http://detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention. In
2005, there were 176 criminal and 1,116 administrative arrests compared to
1,103 criminal and 5,184 administrative arrests in 2008. See U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW:
ANATOMY OF A WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT CASE 3 (2008), available at http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.pdf.
3 Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in US His-
tory, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008 [hereinafter Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting],
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20080711I
MMIG.pdf; see also Letter from Rockne Cole, Criminal Defense Attorney,
to Zoe Lofgren, Congresswoman (July 24, 2008), in 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 25, 29 (2009) [hereinafter Letter from Rockne Cole].
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What is known or has been reported is that the Postville
worksite enforcement action was the largest worksite enforce-
ment action in the history of the United States up until that
time, targeting nearly 400 workers, including women and chil-
dren.4 Those arrested were identified as mostly being from Gua-
temala, with Mayan-sounding surnames,5 and three-quarters of
them were identified as being Cak'chiquel ethnic Mayans from
the hills of Chimaltenango, 6 and by some accounts illiterate or
not fluent in either English or Spanish.7
Those arrested were tried in a make-shift federal district court
set up at the grounds of the National Cattle Congress in Water-
loo, Iowa. Immigrant defendants filed into court in groups of ten
to appear before a federal district court judge. Most pled guilty
to the use of false documents.8 Immediate deportation, follow-
ing the completion of the sentence imposed, was a condition of
4 "[Three-hundred and ninety] were arrested: 314 men and 76 women; 290
Guatemalans, 93 Mexicans, four Ukranians and three Israelis who were not
seen in court." Camayd-Friexas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 2. "In Septem-
ber [2008], the plant owner and managers were charged with 9,311 misde-
meanors alleging they illegally hired minors and let children younger than 16
handle dangerous equipment. The complaint filed by the Iowa attorney gen-
eral's office said the violations involved 32 illegal-immigrant children
younger than 18, including seven who were not yet 16." Raided Meatpacking
Plant Is Heavily Fined, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008.
5 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 1.
6 Erik Camayd-Freixas, Raids, Rights and Reform: The Postville Case and the
Immigration Crisis, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 1, 1 (2009).
7 Working on the Railroad: Treatment of Immigrants After an Iowa Work-
place Raid was an Offense to American Due Process, Hous. CHRON., July 21,
2008, at B8; The Jungle Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008 ("This worker sim-
ply had the papers filled out for him at the plant, since he could not read or
write Spanish, let alone English," (quoting Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting,
supra note 3, at 6)).
8 Press Release, United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Iowa,
297 Convicted and Sentenced Following Arrests at Meatpacking Plant (May
22, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ian/press/May-08/5-22 08
Agriprocessorsl.html.
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the plea agreement. 9 Most were sentenced within four days of
being charged. 1°
Shortly after the raid, court-appointed defense attorneys were
summoned to Cedar Rapids, Iowa for an orientation regarding
the group criminal prosecutions. Defense attorneys were pro-
vided with handbooks that included an overview of the possible
criminal charges. The handbooks also provided a script for ex-
plaining the criminal charges, waiver of rights and the options
available to the workers.11 Defense attorneys agreed to "re-
present up to as many as 30 immigrant defendants."' 2
The majority of those arrested were held in custody at the
Cattle Congress in Waterloo, Iowa. Some women and children
were released pending ongoing legal proceedings. The United
States Attorney announced that 23 juveniles were turned over
to responsible adults or to "specialists."' 13 Some defendants were
also released from detention based on humanitarian grounds.
Mothers, released from detention because they were sole
caregivers, were released on condition of wearing an ankle
bracelet pending a hearing. 14
9 See U.S. Dep't of Justice Plea Agreement, (N.D. Iowa May 13, 2008),
[hereinafter Plea Agreement], available at http://www.aila.org/Content/de-
fault.aspx?docid=25546. "The parties agree defendant is subject to removal
from the United States. Defendant waives the right to notice and a hearing
before an immigration judge and stipulates to entry of a judicial order of
removal from the United States. Defendant shall not unlawfully reenter the
United States." Id.
10 Julia Preston, Feds give illegal workers prison time in major shift, Prosecu-
tions of 297 in Iowa are seen as escalation of crackdown by the administration,
Hous. CHRON., May 24, 2008, at A10 [hereinafter Preston, Prosecutions of
297].
11 Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3.
12 Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N. Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Preston 270 Immigrants].
13 See Press Release, United States Attorney's Office Northern District of
Iowa, supra note 8.
14 See id.; Iowa Immigration Raids Threaten Town's Stability, L. A. TIMES,
May 25, 2008.
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Within ten days after the raid, 297 workers had been con-
victed.15 On May 22, 2008, the Department of Justice's U.S. At-
torney's Office for the Northern District of Iowa announced
that 305 of the 389 people detained by ICE in the Postville raid
were arrested on criminal charges, and 297 of the 305 arrested
pled guilty and were sentenced on federal felony charges. 16 Six
cases were found to involve juveniles and were dismissed.17 The
majority (over 230) of the defendants were sentenced to five
months in prison and three years of supervision for use of false
identification to obtain employment. 18 Other convictions were
based on false use of a social security number or card, or illegal
reentry into the United States.19
By October 2008, many of the individuals who pled guilty had
completed their sentences and were deported to their home
country. As mentioned, as a part of the plea agreement, defend-
ants had to stipulate to a judicial order of removal. An ICE
spokesperson has indicated that 50 of the defendants, however,
were scheduled for immigration hearings in which presumably
they will finally have the opportunity to tell their stories.20 How-
15 Preston, Prosecutions of 297, supra note 10.
16 Press Release, United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Iowa,
supra note 8; Press Release, Convictions Come From Largest Criminal Work-
site Enforcement Operation in U.S. History (May 22, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ian/press/May08/5-22-08-Agriprocessorsl.html.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Trish Mehaffey, Deportations to begin for former meat plant workers,
CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETrE, Oct. 8, 2008. "Tim Counts, spokesman for Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, said he didn't have a number of the peo-
ple who will be deported. Fifty have been deported and another 50 are going
through removal proceedings with an immigration judge." Id. Approximately
40 individuals are represented by pro bono counsel on application for immi-
gration relief available to victims of certain crimes under I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(15)(U). See Family Violence Prevention Fund, http://www.end
abuse.org/content/heroes/detai/810 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). It appears
one person may be represented on an application for political asylum.
Marcelo Ballvd, NEW AM. MEDIA, Sept. 30, 2008, http://news.newamericame-
dia.org/news/viewarticle.html?articleid=CD86ca5f95cOfa93f3dbe228de3a49
Volume 2, Number 1 fPall 200.3
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ever, most of the Postville detainees' stories will never be
known.
The consequences of the ICE raid in Postville have been dev-
astating on the community.21 Agriprocessors filed for bank-
ruptcy.22 Hundreds in Postville, a town of about 2,000, are
without employment.23 Local charities and religious groups have
stepped in to provide assistance to feed and shelter those im-
pacted by the raid.24 The image of "poor immigrant men and
women being dragged away in handcuffs and ankle chains as if
they were killers or terrorists," and the "faces of children sepa-
rated from their parents" are difficult to forget. 25
The Postville raids are open to much critique regarding the
impact they had on families, communities and economies. The
same can be said of the policy considerations that led to over
900 federal officials prioritizing the criminalization of 297 work-
ers over the investigation and prosecution of ongoing labor vio-
lations that had existed at the plant for years26 and the current
da (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). And presumably the minor children arrested in
the workplace raid are being screened for either U visa eligibility or special
immigration juvenile status under I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(J), although nothing
further has been reported. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra.
21 See Steven Greenhouse, Shuttered Meat Plant Edges Back Into Business,
but Its Town Is Still Struggling, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A29. "The plant,
which employed more than 800 workers last spring, has long been the eco-
nomic heart of Postville, a town of about 2,000 residents. Its closing created
shock and despair." Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Henry C. Jackson, Clergy, residents renew call for help in Postville, Assoc.
PRESS, Dec. 11, 2008.
25 Albor Ruiz, International Migrants Day Calls for Change, N. Y. DAILY
NEws, Dec. 21, 2008, at 52.
26 See, e.g., Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction of Undocumented Workers in
Postville, Iowa from May 12 to 22, 2008: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of David Leopold on behalf of
Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n (AILA)) (July 24, 2008), at 7 [hereinafter
Hearings], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Leopold
080724.pdf; see also Letters from Rep. Bruce Braley (D-IA) to Dep't of La-
Volume 2, Number 1 Frall 2008
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and future harms the individuals arrested faced at the plant and
will face if forced to leave the United States.
This article examines the failings of the legal process that was
employed in Postville to convict and remove - effectively with-
out hearing, without trial, or without counsel - 297 noncitizens
from the United States within days of criminal charges being
filed against them.27 The proceedings employed to prosecute the
Agriprocessors workers purported to address both criminal and
administrative violations. However, these judicial removals vio-
lated both the due process required of criminal proceedings and
the statutory rights to notice and opportunity to present de-
fenses required by immigration proceedings.28
Part I of this article will provide a background on the policy
considerations that led to the creation of the judicial removal
procedures (the court procedures employed at Postville), and on
the scope of those proceedings in contrast with civil immigration
proceedings, which is the process typically employed to deter-
mine whether a noncitizen should be removed from the United
bor, Dep't of Justice and Dep't of Homeland Security (May 15, 2008) (ques-
tioning lack of investigation into labor violations at Agriprocessors and
coordination amongst federal agencies as well as the contradictory responses
sent by federal agencies in response to his inquiries), available at http://www.
aila.org/Content/default.aspx?docid=25985 (follow "letter" and "follow-up
letter" hyperlinks).
27 See Letter from Kathleen Campbell Walker, AILA President, and Jeanne
Butterfield, AILA Executive Director, to Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge of the
Northern District of Iowa (May 19, 2008) ("We understand that hundreds of
people arrested pursuant to this enforcement action were denied access to
immigration counsel all day Monday and until Tuesday... inadequate provi-
sions were made to ensure that each individual charged is afforded meaning-
ful access to counsel familiar with both criminal and immigration laws.")
[hereinafter Letter from Kathleen Campbell Walker], available at http://www.
aila.org/Content/default.aspx?docid=25440; see also, Concerns over access to
lawyers are raised, DES MOINES REG., May 14, 2008.
28 For a detailed discussion of the manner in which criminal justice norms
have been imported into immigration law and procedure and the shortcom-
ings of such a model, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).
Volume 2, Number I rall 2oo8
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States. In order to understand the implications of Postville, it is
important to understand what processes and protections are
normally afforded to noncitizens facing removal from the
United States compared to the judicial removal proceedings em-
ployed at Postville. In particular, this section will discuss the lack
of notice and opportunity for workers in Postville to be able to
raise defenses to deportation, including those defenses based on
international human rights law and obligations, and the particu-
lar significance of the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard
in the context of the workers arrested at Postville.
Part II of this article examines the judiciary's role in the
Postville raid and questions whether it was able to maintain in-
dependence and impartiality. The court did not merely decide
the cases that were brought before it, but coordinated with the
federal prosecutors to move the entire court and its staff to a
large compound in order to hear the preliminary stages of the
cases. The obvious logistical barriers to full trials for the defend-
ants gave the impression that the court had an interest in
preventing trials for the defendants. Moreover, the scale of co-
operation, coupled with the fact that the majority of defendants
had little experience with the United States judicial system, con-
tributed to an appearance of bias against the defendants. Addi-
tionally, the statute used by the prosecutors to induce plea
agreements was an impermissible attack on the federal judici-
ary's ability to properly decide cases or controversies.
Part III of this article examines the role of individual rights in
the Postville proceedings. Specifically, it addresses the right to
competent counsel in proceedings that merge criminal defense
proceedings with civil removal proceedings. In understanding
that criminal plea deals were struck to expedite removal from
the United States, it is essential to determine whether the de-
fendants were properly advised as to the propriety of defenses
to removal. Additionally, this section addresses conflicts of in-
terest by attorneys who engage in dual representation.
Volume 2, Number 1 fPal 11208
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Part IV of this article examines the conduct of the prosecutor
in the Postville proceedings. Serious questions surround the pro-
priety of the implementation of a fast-track system at Postville.
It is unclear that the United States Attorney's Office (USAO)
met its burden of showing that fast-tracking was warranted, and
the USAO arguably overstepped its authority and coerced plea
agreements from approximately 300 non-citizens.
I. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE
POSTVILLE PROCEEDINGS
According to the press release issued the day of the Postville
raid from the USAO for the Northern District of Iowa:
[ICE] agents executed a criminal search warrant
• . . for evidence relating to aggravated identity
theft, fraudulent use of Social Security numbers
and other crimes, as well as a civil search warrant
for people illegally in the United States . . . [The
raid was] the largest operation of its type ever in
Iowa. Agents and officers from federal, state, and
local agencies are involved today.
The USAO further stated that:
Anyone encountered during this operation who is
discovered to be in the United States illegally
eventually will be placed into administrative re-
moval proceedings. So far, ICE agents have ar-
rested more than 300 individuals for administrative
immigration violations.
All of those taken into custody during today's op-
eration will be interviewed by ICE agents and
Public Health Service officers to determine if they
have health, caregiver, or other humanitarian con-
cerns. As a result of those interviews, over 40 indi-
viduals have so far been released on humanitarian
Volume 2, Number 1 Fall 2-008
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grounds under supervision, pending future immi-
gration proceedings. 29
Despite the promise of administrative removal proceedings
and the emphasis by the U.S. Attorney that the workers
targeted in this raid were being investigated for administrative
immigration violations, the majority of noncitizens never went
before an administrative law judge for a determination about
civil violations, nor had the opportunity to go before an Immi-
gration Judge to provide reasons that they should be able to re-
main in the United States rather than face deportation to their
home country, a decision that can often be a matter of life or
liberty. Rather, they were given seven days to accept a plea bar-
gain or face an even heavier charge. 30 In some cases, plea bar-
gains were accepted in four days.31 Defense counsel was limited.
Access to immigration counsel was all but nonexistent.32
In order to understand the harm to the individuals involved, it
is important to understand the rights and remedies provided
through administrative removal proceedings. Removal proceed-
ings, formerly called deportation proceedings, are the process
established by Congress through which noncitizens who have vi-
olated United States immigration laws are ordered deported
and ultimately physically removed from the United States.
While Congress's statutory scheme provides a separate adminis-
trative process for deportation determinations for noncitizens
convicted of certain crimes considered more serious,3 3 the deci-
29 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of
Iowa, ICE and Department of Justice Joint Enforcement Action Initiated at
Iowa Meatpacking Plant (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/ian/press/May_08/5_12_08_Agriprocessors.html.
30 See Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3.
31 See Plea Agreement, supra note 9.
32 See Letter from Kathleen Campbell Walker, supra note 27; see also Hear-
ings, Statement of David Leopold, supra note 26.
33 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 238(b)
(2008) (providing for the removal of persons charged with aggravated felo-
nies (those offenses defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(43); including rape, murder, sexual abuse of a minor, theft offenses
Volume 2, Number lf all 2008
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sion of whether a noncitizen apprehended by ICE is deported is
determined principally through the Immigration Courts, which
are specialized courts of limited jurisdiction. 34 Under the proce-
dures established in these removal proceedings, noncitizens
have the opportunity to present defenses to deportation before
an Immigration Judge.35 The remedies or defenses available in
these proceedings are provided by statute and reveal certain
policy considerations regarding whose immigration or criminal
violations may be forgiven.36 Depending on the immigration
charges that trigger deportability or removability, the Immigra-
tion Judge may consider the noncitizen's United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident family relationships, length of resi-
dence in the United States, demonstration of rehabilitation,37 or
the harms the individual will face if returned to his or her home
with a sentence of one year or more, crimes of violence with a sentence of
one year or more, fraud offenses with loss to the victim in excess of $10,000,
firearms, trafficking and drug trafficking offenses) who are not lawful perma-
nent residents of the United States. The procedure provides for notice of the
charges, and if the noncitizen does not respond within 14 days to the charges,
a final order of removal will be entered without hearing.)
34 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, I.N.A. § 240 (2008).
35 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1)(i)-(iv) (2008); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) ("The term Im-
migration Judge means an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as
an administrative judge .. .
36 Id.
37 E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, I.N.A. § 240A(b) provides that an Immigration
Judge may grant lawful permanent resident (L.P.R.) status to a noncitizen
who has resided in the U.S. for at least 10 years and has been a person of
"good moral character" upon a showing that the noncitizen's deportation will
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or
L.P.R. spouse, parent and child. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), I.N.A.
§ 240A(a), the Immigration Judge may cancel the removal of an L.P.R. ren-
dered deportable for having committed certain crimes or immigration viola-
tions with 7 years of lawful status in the U.S., five of which must be as an
L.P.R. Further, the Immigration Judge may consider ties to the community
and family, as well as rehabilitation in determining whether to grant relief
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), I.N.A. § 240A(a).
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country in determining whether or not to order removal from
the United States.38
Some of the defenses to deportation are discretionary. Even if
a noncitizen demonstrates that she or he meets the statutorily
enumerated elements required for relief, the Immigration Judge
may still deny the application and order deportation in his or
her discretion.39 Other defenses are nondiscretionary, meaning
that if a noncitizen applicant has demonstrated she or he meets
the statutory elements, the Immigration Judge must grant relief
and the individual may not be deported.40 This section of the
article will examine the procedures and remedies afforded to
noncitizens in traditional removal proceedings and the way that
the Postville proceedings prevented noncitizen respondents
from raising these defenses.
Removal Proceedings: Judicial Responsibilities
The current overall structure for proceedings to remove
noncitizens from the United States has been in place since 1996.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which made substan-
tive changes to deportation procedures and created new restric-
tions on defenses available in removal proceedings. 41
Notwithstanding these sweeping changes, IIRIRA retained cer-
tain procedural protections, provided by statute and regulations,
regarding the rights of a noncitizen in removal proceedings.
Under the existing statutory scheme, the presiding Immigration
38 Asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158, I.N.A. § 208; 8 C.F.R. § 208), withholding of
removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231, I.N.A. § 241; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16) and the Conven-
tion Against Torture (8 C.F.R. § 208.17).
39 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 ("Immigration Judges exercise the powers and duties
delegated to them by the Act and by the Attorney General through regula-
tion."); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1987).
40 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-29.
41 See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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Judge must advise the respondent of his or her right to counsel
(at the noncitizen's expense), the right to present evidence, the
right to examine and object to evidence presented and the right
to cross-examine witnesses.42 The Immigration Judge must ad-
vise of the availability of free or low-cost legal services,4 3 and
must read and explain the factual and legal allegations in the
charging document, called a Notice to Appear for Removal Pro-
ceedings.44 Further, and perhaps most relevant to our critique of
the non-traditional judicial removal proceedings employed at
Postville, the Immigration Judge has a duty to inform of poten-
tial eligibility for relief from removal 4s at a point in the proceed-
ings so that the right is not inadvertently waived. 46 In light of the
complicated nature of immigration laws, this rule "is intended to
protect the alien against the risk of error by his or her lawyer." 47
42 I.N.A. § 240(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10.
43 See United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1211-1213 (10th Cir.
2004) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (finding that failure to advise the immigrant
respondent of the availability of free or low cost legal services may support
an argument that proceedings are fundamentally unfair).
44 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10.
45 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) ("The Immigration Judge shall inform the alien
of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any benefits enumerated in this
chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during
the hearing, in accordance with the provisions of 1240.8(d)."); see also Asani
v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Korsunskiy v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The immigration judge has a duty not to mis-
lead an alien and ensure that there is good ground for removal or exclusion.
The absence of counsel, in other words, is not an adequate justification for
ruling against the alien; the agency still must prove its contentions in a fairly
conducted proceeding.").
46 In re Cordova, 22 I. & N. Dec. 966, 970 (BIA 1999) ("To ensure all aliens
are informed of this relief in a manner which allows them to timely apply, the
Immigration Judge should notify any respondent who is apparently eligible
for this relief no later than at the master calendar hearing at which the case is
initially calendared for a merits hearing. If ... there is no separate master
calendar hearing, the information regarding [I.N.A. §] 240B(a) [voluntary de-
parture], and the opportunity to apply for this form of voluntary departure
should be provided prior to the taking of pleadings in the matter, so that the
respondent will not inadvertently waive his or her right to apply for relief.").
47 Asani, 154 F.3d at 727.
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While there may be some disagreement among the circuits re-
garding whether the Immigration Judge's failure to inform the
respondent of potential remedies constitutes a due process vio-
lation, the disagreement is over the right to be informed of dis-
cretionary remedies. 48 No circuit has held that the Immigration
Judge does not have a duty to inform the respondent of nondis-
cretionary remedies, which include those that prevent a nonci-
tizen from being returned to a country where he or she faces
persecution or torture.
Further, both the Immigration Judge and the attorney for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) prosecuting the
noncitizen in a removal proceeding may introduce evidence.49
This evidence is not limited to evidence of removability, but also
includes evidence relevant to eligibility for relief. It appears that
during the Postville removal proceedings that followed the
Agriprocessors raid, neither the federal court judges nor the
prosecutors made any inquiries into eligibility for relief from de-
portation, much less introduced information regarding potential
remedies. The lack of inquiry into remedies by either the district
court judge or the prosecutor is not only inconsistent with re-
moval proceedings procedures, it also appears to violate the
DHS's own directives for the use of judicial deportation
procedures. 50
48 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70-73 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that
"a failure to advise a potential deportee of a right to seek § 212(c) relief can,
if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair within the meaning of § 1326(d)(3). To
be sure, relief under § 212(c) is not constitutionally mandated and is discre-
tionary. It does not follow, however, that where an alien is erroneously de-
nied information regarding the right to seek such relief, and the erroneous
denial of that information results in a deportation that likely would have
been avoided if the alien was properly informed, such error is not fundamen-
tally unfair within the meaning of § 1326(d)(3)"). But see Aguirre-Tello, 353
F. 3d at 1205 (holding, after reviewing circuit court decisions , "there is no
constitutional right to be informed of the existence of discretionary relief for
which a potential deportee might be eligible.").
49 In Re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726 (BIA 1997).
50 See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to All Federal
Prosecutors, at 5-7 (Apr. 28, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/read-
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Immigration Remedies Related to Past or Future Harm
Defenses to deportation from the United States and claims to
lawful status fall within certain general categories: defenses
based on years of residence and equities,51 remedies based on
family relationships, 52 remedies based on economic interests of
the United States, 53 and defenses based on certain domestic pol-
icy considerations, 54 humanitarian considerations 55 and interna-
tional obligations. With regard to international obligations,
three defenses to deportation are related to international human
rights obligations not to return individuals to a country where
they would face pain, suffering or torture. These defenses are
ingroom/deportation95.htm. The memo directs that requests for judicial de-
portation and stipulated deportation orders should be made in cases where
the noncitizen is not a lawful permanent resident and where the criminal of-
fense can be categorized as either an "aggravated felony," as defined in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)43, a "serious crime of violence" that involves moral turpi-
tude or "two or more serious crimes of violence that indisputably involve
moral turpitude-voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual abuse, arson,
robbery, burglary, or aggravated assault.. .[similarly] a judicial order of de-
portation should not be sought if the alien has any colorable claim for relief
from deportation." Id. See Immigration Raids: Postville and Beyond, Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security,
and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of the
American Civil Liberties Union) (July 24, 2008), www.aclu.org/images/asset-
uploadfile428_36231.pdf.
51 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(A)-(B), I.N.A. § 240A(a)-(b).
52 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a), I.N.A. § 203(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(A), I.N.A.
§ 240A(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), (i), I.N.A. § 245(a), (i).
53 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b), I.N.A. § 203(b).
54 See, e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), I.N.A. § 240A(b)(2) (survivors of domes-
tic violence); I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(U) (victims of certain crimes who are help-
ful in investigation or prosecution of the crime); I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(T)
(victims of severe forms of human trafficking who assist in providing infor-
mation regarding traffickers); I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(S) (government
informants).
55 See, e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a I.N.A. § 244, (temporary protected status for
individuals from identified countries suffering from civil strife or natural
disaster).
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asylum, withholding of removal and the Convention Against
Torture.56
A noncitizen of the United States who has either suffered
harm or fears future harm on account of a protected characteris-
tic may request asylum in the United States. In order to estab-
lish eligibility for asylum, the applicant must show that she or he
meets the definition of a "refugee" under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). A refugee is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such per-
son's nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is un-
able or unwilling to return to, and is unable or un-
willing to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion.57
Asylum is a discretionary remedy. An Immigration Judge may
decline to grant asylum in his or her discretion even where past
or future persecution can be shown.58
A separate, nondiscretionary remedy, withholding of removal,
is available to individuals who have suffered persecution in the
past or are likely to suffer persecution in the future.59 Consistent
with international obligations, our immigration laws prevent re-
moval to a country where the noncitizen's "life or freedom
would be threatened. '60
While asylum requires demonstrating a reasonable possibility
of future persecution, withholding of removal requires that fu-
56 I.N.A. § 208 (asylum); I.N.A. § 241 (withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208 (Convention Against Torture).
57 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), I.N.A. § 101(a)(42).
58 See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 471 (BIA 1987).
59 8 U.S.C. § 1231, I.N.A. § 241.
60 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), I.N.A.§ 241(b)(3).
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ture persecution be more likely than not.61 However, for both
asylum and withholding of removal, a claim based on past perse-
cution requires the same evidentiary showing.62
Further, Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Convention Against Torture or CAT) prevents the
United States from returning a noncitizen to a country where
there is a likelihood that the individual will be tortured.63 The
United States signed CAT on April 18, 1988, and in 1999 the
Department of Justice published regulations establishing the
process for raising claims for protection from torture under
CAT.64 Article 3 of CAT prohibits the expulsion, return
("refouler") or extradition of any person to a country where
there are "substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subject to torture." 65 In determining whether
substantial grounds exist, "the competent authorities" must con-
61 See generally INS v.Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
62 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(ii), 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii).
63 64 Fed. Reg. 8478-01 (Feb. 19, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3, 103, 208,
235, 238, 240, 241, 253, 507).
64 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.
65 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.
(1) Torture, for purposes of individuals in the United States
bringing a claim before an Immigration Judge, is defined as
"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity.
(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment
(3) Torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions... includ[ing] judi-
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sider, among other things, the existence "of a consistent pattern
of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights." 66
The procedure by which a person who fears harm in his or her
home country may apply for either asylum, withholding of re-
moval or CAT is through a United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services (USCIS) application form, which is used to
pursue all three remedies. An application for asylum is deemed
to be an application for withholding of removal as well, and an
applicant can indicate on the same application his or her interest
cially imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions author-
ized by law, including the death penalty ....
(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or suffering must
be prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(i) The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(ii) The administration or application, or threatened adminis-
tration or application, of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality;
(iii) The threat of imminent death; or
(iv) The threat that another person will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the ad-
ministration or application of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense
or personality.
(5) In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.
An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of
pain and suffering is not torture.
(6) In order to constitute torture an act must be directed
against a person in the offender's custody or physical control.
(7) Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public
official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have aware-
ness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal re-
sponsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.
(8) Noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards
does not per se constitute torture.
66 Id.
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in seeking protection under CAT.67 Each remedy has different
burdens of proof, and the Immigration Judge is charged with
making separate determinations on each remedy.68 As men-
tioned earlier, the Immigration Judge has a duty to inform the
noncitizen of eligibility for withholding and CAT, and arguably
for asylum as well.
For those noncitizens who are not in removal proceedings or
whose prior removal from the United States precludes the initia-
tion of removal proceedings, the law still provides avenues and
certain minimal protections to identify those at risk of persecu-
tion or harm.69 Individuals who have arguably more egregious
immigration or criminal violations than those involved in
Postville are eligible to raise a claim for protection for withhold-
ing of removal or CAT. For example, noncitizens who have ei-
ther unlawfully re-entered the United States after a prior order
of removal or individuals who were issued administrative re-
moval orders by the agency (DHS), rather than by an Immigra-
tion Judge, for conviction of an "aggravated felony," and are
therefore ineligible for traditional removal proceedings, can still
raise a claim for protection under withholding of removal or
CAT.7° Even those individuals with the most serious convictions
or with previous removal orders are provided with an opportu-
nity to present their claim for protection from harm and have
the opportunity for a hearing on the issue of eligibility for with-
holding or CAT before an Immigration Judge. No such guidance
was provided for individuals subjected to the judicial removal
67 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3; see also Form 1-589, Application for Asylum
and Withholding of Removal, available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/us-
cis (follow "Immigration Forms" hyperlink).
68 See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-429; Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d
504, 512-13 (4th Cir. 2008); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 790-91 (9th Cir.
2005).
69 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31, which notably applies to I.N.A. § 238(b) expedited
removal proceedings for those with aggravated felonies or I.N.A § 241(a)(5)
proceedings for reinstatement of prior removal orders, but makes no refer-
ence to I.N.A. § 238(c) judicial removal proceedings.
70 8 C.F.R. § 208.31.
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proceedings used against the Agriprocessors employees7' in the
forum of a federal district court, where presumably there would
be more procedural protections.
Judicial Orders of Removal or Deportation
It is significant that DHS and the U.S. Attorney utilized an
unfamiliar immigration law provision to pursue prosecution and
deportation of hundreds of noncitizen workers, few of whom
had prior criminal histories, and whose offenses could have been
pursued equally through an administrative process. The district
court judges at Postville had authority at the time of sentencing
to enter judicial orders of removal against removable defend-
ants. 72 However, the legislative history behind the INA reveals
an intent to use judicial deportation proceedings, the precursor
to judicial removal proceedings, to improve the agency's effec-
tiveness at deporting noncitizens convicted of crimes and to re-
duce state costs for incarceration of noncitizens convicted of
crimes. 73 The enactment of judicial deportation proceedings in
71 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 5.
72 I.N.A. § 238(c).
73 See 139 CONG. REC. S16263-01 (Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bryan):
Today, I am asking the Senate to approve two immigration
amendments which Senators Biden and Hatch have agreed to
accept as part of their manager's amendment....
The first amendment has two major components which hope-
fully will close loopholes in immigration laws: (1) Procedures
to speed up the deportation of criminal aliens convicted of ag-
gravated felonies by combining their deportation hearing into
their sentencing hearing. Instead of first releasing the alien
from prison and later holding a separate hearing as is being
done now, often months or even a year or more later, those
who break U.S. laws could be deported immediately after serv-
ing their prison sentence.... A second hearing can be avoided
by combining the deportation hearing with the alien sentenc-
ing. A Federal judge can enter a final order of deportation at
the same time the judge sentences the alien for committing an
aggravated felony. It currently costs the taxpayer an average of
$60 to $70 per day to simply house convicted alien felons pend-
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1994 resulted from public debate and a flurry of Congressional
activity focused on noncitizen criminals.74 Judicial deportation
and removal proceedings arrived in the midst of significant legis-
lative changes to immigration laws, marking a dramatic shift in
ing deportation, after completion of their prison sentence. Not
to mention the cost of the immigration judges, court staff, at-
torneys, interpreters, and facilities necessary to institute the de-
portation proceedings. Such a system must come to an end....
To sum up, my first amendment today will streamline adminis-
trative deportation proceedings for criminal aliens who are not
permanent aliens, eliminating the redundant and bureaucratic
system that exists today. An alien convicted of an aggravated
felony will be presumed to be deportable, and at sentencing in
Federal court, the judge would have the ability to enter the fi-
nal order of deportation at the same time they hand down the
sentence.
See also 139 CONG. REC. S16263-01 (statement of Sen. Dole):
Aliens-both legal and illegal-constitute an inordinately large
portion of our total prison population.... This amendment at-
tempts to address the criminal-alien problem .... The amend-
ment would also authorize Federal trial judges to issue a
deportation order at the sentencing hearing. Prior to the issu-
ance of the order, the trial judge must obtain the concurrence
of the commissioner of the INS . . .these provisions are de-
signed to ensure that, once they have served out their
sentences, criminal aliens will return to their country of origin,
rather than return to the streets of our country to commit acts
of violence once again.
See also 139 CONG. REC. S16263-01 (statement of Sen. Simpson):
This amendment addresses the serious national problem of
aliens who commit serious crimes in the United States .... It
streamlines the deportation procedures for criminal aliens and
allows the Federal district courts, at the request of the attorney
general, to issue deportation orders at the sentencing hearing
of aliens convicted of an aggravated felony ....
74 See, e.g. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM REPORT TO CONGRESS
"BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 3, 5
(1997) ("A large number of aliens-more than 250,000 in the past eight
years-have been issued removal orders, but never been removed .... In its
1994 report ["Restoring Credibility"] the Commission recommended that the
top enforcement priority should be the removal of criminal aliens from the
U.S. in such a way that their potential return to the U.S. will be minimized.").
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domestic immigration law policies on prosecution and criminal-
ization of immigrants and refugees75
The 1994 Judicial Deportation Statute
An examination of the 1994 Judicial Deportation statute pro-
vides insight into the policy purposes and intended reach of ear-
lier enacted judicial deportation proceedings, the precursor to
the judicial removal proceedings employed at Postville. In 1994,
Congress for the first time created judicial deportation proceed-
ings. The statute provided federal district court judges, in the
context of federal criminal proceedings, the authority to order
the deportation of a defendant for certain categories of crimes
only if such an order was requested by the United States Attor-
ney.76 In doing so, Congress departed from a "long tradition of
granting the Executive Branch the sole power to institute depor-
tation proceedings against aliens." 77
The 1994 legislation enacted a panoply of procedures aimed at
expeditiously trying and removing "criminal aliens," particularly
those convicted of serious crimes, with little opportunity for
presentation of defenses. This legislation followed perceived
public outcry and Congressional speeches over the supposed
large numbers of noncitizens in the United States convicted of
75 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 639 (2004) (providing a thorough examination and critique of the
criminalization of immigration laws).
76 8 U.S.C. § 1252a, I.N.A. § 242A(d) ("Notwithstanding any other provision
of this Act, a United States district court shall have jurisdiction to enter a
judicial order of deportation at the time of sentencing against an alien whose
criminal conviction causes such alien to be deportable under § 241(a)(2)(A)
[crimes of moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, aggravated felo-
nies], if such an order has been requested by the United States Attorney with
the concurrence of the Commissioner and if the court chooses to exercise
such jurisdiction.")
77 United States v. Quaye, 57 F. 3d 447, 449-450 (5th Cir. 1995).
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crimes, 78 the supposed rising costs to States of incarcerating
these noncitizens, 79 the apparent delay in issuing and effecting
deportation orders8o and concern over the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service's (INS) ability to immediately apprehend
and remove "criminal aliens" following conviction and comple-
tion of incarceration.81
Congressional proposals particularly targeted individuals con-
victed of "aggravated felonies," which are considered serious
crimes under the immigration statute. 82 The term "aggravated
felony" has a specific meaning under the INA. The term first
appeared in the INA following the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, which classified convictions of murder, weapons and con-
78 See, e.g. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, 139
CONG. REC. S16263-01 (1993) (statement of Sen. Reid on S. 1607) ("[Tlhe
people of this country are clamoring for something to be done about the
plague of violent crime throughout our nation ... criminal aliens are a large
and growing problem for our country .... These criminals, many of whom
are illegally in the country to begin with, are responsible for inflicting un-
quantifiable pain and terror on law-abiding citizens.").
79 See 139 CONG. REC. E749-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. McCullom) ("Our
Federal, State and local prisons are crowded with large numbers of criminal
aliens. About one-quarter of the Federal prison inmate population is foreign-
born .... State and local jails have similarly large percentages of criminal
aliens, many of whom are in the United States illegally. The burden on the
criminal justice system, especially in high-impact States like Florida, New
York, California, and Texas, is straining already overstretched budgets.").
80 See 139 CONG. REC. E749-02 (statement of Sen. McCullom) ("Even when
criminal aliens are turned over to INS and detained, the administrative pro-
cess for deportation is time-consuming.").
81 See 139 CONG. REc. E749-02 (statement of Sen. McCullom) ("Deportable
criminal aliens who are released from prison may or may not be turned over
to INS.... If INS does not detain these aliens upon their release from prison,
the Government loses control over them and locating and deporting them
becomes very difficult.").
82 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16232-03, S16265 (statement of Sen. Bryan)
("[U]nder current immigration law, an alien who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony is presumed to be deportable from the United States. This
means that in virtually every case, once an alien is convicted of an aggravated
felony, a very serious crime, and the alien has served his or her prison time,
they should be deported. This is not happening.").
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trolled substance trafficking and other weapons violations as ag-
gravated felonies and expanded the consequences which flowed
from such convictions.83 Congress expanded the categories of
crimes considered "aggravated felonies" in 1990 and again in
1994, when it also implemented judicial deportation orders and
again in 1996, when the judicial deportation orders were
amended and reclassified as judicial removal orders.84 Currently,
there are 21 categories of aggravated felonies. 85
For those convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in the
1994 statute as amended, the law provided for special deporta-
tion hearings to be held "at certain federal, state, and local cor-
rectional facilities" to "eliminat[e] the need for additional
detention" and assure expeditious deportation immediately fol-
lowing the end of "incarceration for the underlying sentence." 86
These expedited proceedings prioritized the initiation and com-
pletion of deportation proceedings "of any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony before the alien's release from incarcera-
tion." 87 The statute also provided special provisions for issuance
of an administrative order of deportation after 30 days notice
for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies who were not
lawful permanent residents and not eligible for any type of im-
migration relief. All of these proceedings contemplated a sepa-
rate immigration proceeding following a completed and final
criminal proceeding. This section of the statute, entitled "expe-
dited deportation of aliens convicted of committing aggravated
felonies" also included the provisions for judicial orders of de-
portation.88 It was initially intended that judicial deportation
83 See generally, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988).
84 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009, Div. C (1996).
85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), I.N.A. § 101(a)(43).
86 I.N.A. § 242A.
87 I.N.A. § 242A(b)-(c).
88 I.N.A. § 242A (emphasis added).
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would be an additional tool for ensuring the prompt removal of
aggravated felons.89
The procedure set forth in the 1994 statute required the U.S.
Attorney to file "a notice of intent to request judicial deporta-
tion" to both the court and the defendant before either entering
a guilty plea or beginning trial.90 Notice of the factual charges
regarding alienage and identification of the crime or crimes ren-
dering the defendant deportable had to be filed by the U.S. At-
torney, with the concurrence of the Commissioner of INS,91 at
least 30 days before the sentencing date.92 Under the judicial
deportation procedure, if the court determined that the defen-
dant presented "substantial evidence to establish prima facie eli-
gibility for relief from deportation," the INS Commissioner had
to provide the court "with a recommendation and report regard-
ing the alien's eligibility for relief" for the court to "either grant
or deny the relief sought. '93 If the court denied a request for a
judicial order of deportation without a decision on the merits,
the Attorney General could still initiate deportation proceed-
ings pursuant to former INA § 242 on the same or other grounds
of deportability.
While the judicial deportation provisions set forth some of the
same rights for the noncitizen found in traditional INA § 242
deportation proceedings, including "an opportunity to examine
evidence against him or her, to present evidence on his or her
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government," the judicial deportation provisions made no ref-
erence to the duty to inform the noncitizen of potential eligibil-
ity for relief.94 Nor were any regulations promulgated providing
89 139 CONG. REC. S16232-03, S16265 (1993) (statement of Sen. Reid).
90 8 U.S.C. § 1252a, I.N.A. § 242A(d)(2) (1996).
91 The term "Commissioner" refers to the old I.N.S. Commissioner. The
Commissioner's duties now fall on district directors of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, part of the Dep't of Homeland Security.
92 8 U.S.C. § 1252a, I.N.A. § 242A(d)(2).
93 Id.
94 Id.
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guidance for how determinations were to be made under these
proceedings. This essentially created a parallel proceeding by
which a determination of deportability could be made (including
all the penalties that attach to such a determination) that did not
provide the safeguard under INA § 242 that requires that a
noncitizen be advised of any defenses to deportation.95
The 1996 Judicial Deportation Statute
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) made sweeping changes to U.S. immigration
laws. IIRIRA changed the structure of deportation proceedings,
expanded the bars to lawful permanent residence and grounds
for deportation, imposed a statute of limitations and additional
restrictions on the granting of asylum or withholding of removal,
and also amended the judicial deportation provisions.96
With regard to judicial deportation, the provision was
renamed Judicial Removal. Now the district courts had "juris-
diction to enter a judicial order of removal at the time of sen-
tencing against an alien who is deportable," making no reference
to the criminal grounds of deportability articulated in the 1994
statute.97 Under this revision to judicial deportation, the courts
now had authority to order removal on the basis of deportation
95 While we recognize that Congress has plenary power over immigration
laws, see, e.g,. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972), and limited
ability to challenge selective prosecution claims, see Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US 471, 510 (1999) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing), the facts surrounding Postville, with a majority of defendants of one
nationality, raise questions regarding equal protection. If I.N.A. § 238(c)
proceedings are criminal proceedings, unlike Congress' authority over immi-
gration law, the Constitution does limit the authority of the executive branch
and prosecutors in criminal proceedings, and in the case of Postville, these
criminal proceedings were brought in a manner that effectively precluded
groups of people from defenses to deportation and may have been intended
to prevent defendants from applying for immigration relief.
96 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-46 (1996)
97 8 U.S.C. § 1228, I.N.A. § 238 ("Expedited Removal of Aliens Convicted
of Committing Aggravated Felonies." (emphasis added)).
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grounds unrelated to criminal charges. 98 The statute nevertheless
still seems to presume that deportability grounds will be crimi-
nal, as the U.S. Attorney and INS Commissioner are required to
file "a charge containing factual allegations regarding the alien-
age of the defendant and identifying the crime or crimes which
make the defendant deportable" at least 30 days prior to the date
set for sentencing. 99 The 1996 statute further amended judicial
deportation proceedings by allowing the Attorney General to
initiate proceedings under separate, traditional removal proce-
dures even where the district court had denied a request for a
judicial deportation on the merits.100 Thus the statute allows the
98 Gerald L. Neuman, Admissions and Denials: A Dialogic Introduction to
the Immigration Law Symposium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1395, 1408 n.63 (1997).
"Now that IIRIRA has expanded judicial deportation to include any grounds
of deportation against the convicted alien ... the court may have additional
reason for unfamiliarity with the issues." Id.
99 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(B), I.N.A. § 238(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
100 Compare the language of former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)(4), I.N.A. § 242(c)(4)
(1996):
Denial without a decision on the merits of a request for a judi-
cial order of deportation shall not preclude the Attorney Gen-
eral from initiating deportation proceedings pursuant to section
1252 of this title upon the same ground of deportability or upon
any other ground of deportability provided under section
1251(a) of this title.
with the language of 8 U.S.C. 1228(c)(4), I.N.A. § 238(c)(4):
Denial of Judicial Order-Denial of a request for a judicial order
of removal shall not preclude the Attorney General from initi-
ating removal proceedings pursuant to § 240 upon the same
ground of deportability or upon any other ground of de-
portability provided under § 241(a).
For a succinct overview of the judicial removal proceedings enacted by
IIRIRA, see Neuman, supra note 98, at 1408 ("The judicial deportation pro-
cedures were modified by § 374 of IIRIRA. . . . One amendment expands
the scope of application of the judicial deportation procedures to all federal
convictions of deportable aliens, making the courts available for deportation
of convicted aliens on grounds unrelated to their convictions. But another
strikes the phrase italicized above, 'without a decision on the merits.' Read
literally, this means that a federal district court's holding that an alien is not
deportable does not preclude the Attorney General from deporting the alien
on the same ground. In other words, it would allow the court to rule against
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government a second chance at a finding of deportability
through the administrative removal procedures, whereas the im-
migrant respondent has no such opportunity to appeal if the fed-
eral court judge rules against him or her.
The statutory framework used to deport the vast majority of
the people arrested in the Postville raids comes from 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(c). Before we can examine why the deportation orders
that resulted from Postville are suspect, we must first under-
stand how a federal district court, rather than an Immigration
Judge, could order removal from the United States at all.
The statute used by the prosecution, and ultimately by the
federal judiciary to issue removal orders of the Agriprocessors
employees, lays out a procedural roadmap that begins with a
criminal prosecution but ends with an order that removes a per-
son from the United States. This roadmap is an unusual one.
In order for a district court to assert jurisdiction and order
removal from the United States, Congress requires that certain
steps be followed. 0 1 First, the U.S. Attorney must file a notice
prior to trial with the Court and DHS indicating a desire to re-
quest a judicial removal following criminal conviction. After the
notice has been given, the Commissioner files an outline of facts
that alleges alienage and identifies the crimes that may cause the
person to be deportable. At this point, if and only if the defen-
dant has managed to bring substantial evidence of prima facie
relief from removal, the Commissioner will provide the federal
court with a recommendation and give a report stating eligibility
for relief. Upon receiving the recommendation, the court "shall
either grant or deny the relief sought."'10 2 The "court may order
the alien deported if the Attorney General demonstrates that
the alien is deportable under this Act."'10 3 Finally, even if the
the alien, but would deny res judicata effect to a ruling in the alien's favor."
(citations omitted)).
101 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c).
102 § 1228(c)(2)(C).
103 § 1228(c)(2)(C)(iv).
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court declines to order removal, it does not prevent the "Attor-
ney General from initiating removal proceedings" based on the
exact same grounds of deportability. 10 4
Further, the 1996 statute provides for stipulated judicial or-
ders of removal, a provision not found in the 1994 Act, which
allow someone who is deportable "to waive the right to notice"
and a hearing and be deported as part of a criminal plea
agreement. 105
The 1996 statutory scheme lacks the same procedural gui-
dance as the 1994 statute. While it contains the same opportu-
nity to examine evidence, to present evidence, and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the government, the language
of the federal statute makes no reference to an affirmative duty
to inform the noncitizen of potential eligibility for relief.10 6 As
with the 1994 statute, no regulations were promulgated that
would have provided the district court, the agency or the defen-
dant with guidance regarding considerations for denying a re-
quest for judicial deportation, or that explained how
determinations regarding deportability or eligibility for relief
from deportation would be made.10 7
Additional IIRIRA provisions, which included continued au-
thorization of federal criminal court judges to enter orders of
removal, reflect a legislative intent to expand the number of
crimes rendering a noncitizen deportable, including expanding
the definition of aggravated felony, restricting the remedies
104 § 1228(c)(4).
105 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5), I.N.A. § 238(c)(5).
106 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(ii), I.N.A. 238(c)(2)(ii).
107 While agency regulations binding the federal district court may have
been impermissible, see authors' further discussion of separation of powers,
infra pp. 71-74, the judicial removal proceedings are arguably a strange hy-
brid of administrative and criminal proceedings in which the statute incorpo-
rates by reference other agency regulations that are binding on the federal
district court (e.g., regarding evidence that may be introduced). Further, reg-
ulations not only aid the trier of fact and the agency in making determina-
tions, but they also notify the parties of the standards to be adhered to.
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available in removal proceedings, in particular for those with
criminal convictions and limiting review of deportability deter-
minations based on crimes.108
The Current Legal Landscape and Realities of Immigration
Challenge the Objectives of Judicial Removal
The 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the INA affecting removal
proceedings, deportability and inadmissibility grounds, including
those expanding the scope of judicial removal proceedings, re-
flect an intent to limit defenses to removal for noncitizens with
criminal convictions, ensuring the effective removal of nonci-
tizens with criminal convictions from the United States and lim-
iting the costs of incarceration of noncitizens. However, using
judicial removal proceedings as a way of addressing those con-
cerns is misplaced today given the current statutory scheme and
the current realities of the noncitizen population in the United
States.
The existing statutory scheme contains a plethora of provi-
sions ensuring the speedy and effective deportation of nonci-
tizens with criminal convictions. To begin with, under the
current statute, most noncitizens with criminal convictions are
ineligible for release from custody, deterring them from pro-
longing proceedings and preventing them from being released
into communities prior to completion of removal proceedings.
With the advent of mandatory detention in 1996, nearly all
noncitizens with criminal convictions are held in DHS custody
without the possibility of bond,10 9 alleviating Congressional con-
cerns about "criminal aliens" being released back into society
before removal can be effected.
108 See, e.g., expanded definition of aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43), I.N.A. § 101(a)(43) (1996); additional grounds of deportability
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(E) (1996); limitation on judicial
review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), I.N.A. § 242(e) (1996).
109 8 U.S.C. § 1226, I.N.A. § 236.
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Similarly, the use of expedited procedures, including judicial
removal, to address the exploding numbers of noncitizen
criminals in the United States is also misplaced. The perception
that the commission of crimes by noncitizens is escalating, and
can be addressed through immigration laws like judicial orders
of removal to speed up their removal, is simply not supported by
the facts. 110 Further, use of judicial removal to address concerns
over the costs for government to house noncitizens who have
committed crimes is similarly inapposite."
A review of the legislative record regarding judicial deporta-
tion or removal proceedings reveals Congress's belief in effec-
tive use of judicial resources by allowing the federal court judge,
familiar with the underlying criminal proceedings, to make a de-
termination about deportability as well. However, because the
statute currently provides for judicial removal proceedings for a
broad array of removable offenses (including noncriminal), the
federal court judge in judicial removal proceedings is in the po-
sition of determining significant immigration issues, not just
criminal issues.112 In judicial removal proceedings, a federal
court judge may now be asked to examine any ground of de-
portability having nothing to do with criminal charges. When the
charge is criminal, examination and analysis of the criminal
charge is only the beginning of the inquiry when determining
whether a noncitizen will be deported from the United States.
Even if the criminal charge of deportability can be sustained,
deportation is not an inevitable consequence. The noncitizen
110 See IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., FROM ANECDOTES TO EVIDENCE: SET-
TING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON IMMIGRANTS AND CRIME 1 (2008) [herein-
after ANECDOTES] (citing RICHARD NADLER, AMERICAS MAJORITY FOUND.,
IMMIGRATION AND THE WEALTH OF STATES 9 (2008)), available at http://
www.immigrationpolicy.org/images/File/factcheck/SettingtheRecordStraight
onlmmigrantsandCrime9-10-08.pdf.
111 Trish Mehaffey, ICE Releases Raid Costs to Rep. Bruce Braley, CEDAR
RAPIDS GAZETTE, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.gazetteonline.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081017/NEWS/710179993/1006/news (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2009).
112 See Neuman, supra note 98, at 1407 n.63.
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may still have a number of remedies available. In the case of the
criminal charges brought in Postville, even if the federal district
court judges were in a position to make determinations about
the elements required to support a criminal charge, the facts sur-
rounding Postville undercut this justification for judicial re-
moval. The ultimate disposition of the majority of the cases
came through stipulated plea agreements, and with as many as
95 defendants rushed through in a day, it is unlikely that the
goal of ensuring that a federal court judge had an appreciation
of the particular facts involved in an individual case was a con-
sideration. Finally, the public statement by the Chief Judge
Linda R. Reade indicates a lack of appreciation for the intersec-
tion between criminal and immigration law.113
Judicial Removal in Postville was Misplaced
The language of the judicial removal statute provides jurisdic-
tion to federal district courts in cases where the noncitizen is
deportable. Immigration laws distinguish between noncitizens
that have made an "admission" into the United States, defined
as a lawful entry with inspection, from those who have not made
an admission into the United States.114 The latter group is con-
sidered seeking an admission into the United States, notwith-
standing their physical presence in the United States and the
grounds of inadmissibility (qualitative bars to entry), including
criminal grounds of inadmissibility. 115 For noncitizens with crim-
inal convictions that have made an admission into the United
States, they are classified as "deportable."116 It appears from the
reported facts that a significant number of defendants in the
Postville case would have never made an admission into the
United States, so rather than being considered deportable, they
113 Preston, 270 Immigrants, supra note 12 (Immigration lawyers "do not un-
derstand the federal criminal process as it relates to immigration charges.").
114 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), I.N.A. § 101(a)(13).
115 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), I.N.A § 212(a)(2).
116 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), I.N.A. § 237(a)(2).
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would be classified as seeking admission.117 Therefore, the fed-
eral court, under the judicial removal proceedings provisions,
had no jurisdiction over them.118 In the area of immigration, the
difference between those who have made an admission from
those who have not is more than a technical distinction, it is a
distinction with a difference implicating rights and remedies. 119
Further, the use of judicial removal proceedings to pursue in-
dividuals whose crimes involve the use of false documents is
similarly misplaced. Although the statutory language proscrib-
ing judicial deportation or removal proceedings solely for aggra-
vated felonies was ultimately left out of the 1994 statute, and the
1996 statute may allow broad use of judicial removal proceed-
ings for various grounds of removability, the Congressional re-
cord indicates an intent to focus on expeditious removal of
noncitizens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies-
e.g. drug and firearm trafficking crimes, crimes of violence,
fraud with loss to the victim in excess of $10,000 and theft of-
fenses.120 The name of the caption of the section of the statute,
"Expedited deportation of aliens convicted of committing aggra-
vated felonies," further substantiates that argument. 121 The use
of fraudulent employment documents, the criminal charge for
which most were convicted, does not constitute an aggravated
felony1 22 and, therefore, judicial removal proceedings should
never have been used in Postville.
117 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), I.N.A. § 101(a)(13)(A).
118 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 26 (statement of David Leopold).
119 E.g., an applicant for admission has some substantive due process protec-
tions, whereas someone who is deportable is provided with full due process
and equal protection. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
120 See 139 CONG. REC. S16263-01, supra note 73.
121 8 U.S.C. § 1228, I.N.A. § 238.
122 While the definition of aggravated felony at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P),
I.N.A. § 101(a)(43)(P) does include "an offense (i) which either is falsely
making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instru-
ment in violation of section 1543 of Title 18, or is described in section 1546(a)
of such title and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12
months." A violation of 1546(a) that is a first offense and for which the
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Judicial Removal Proceedings Deprived Postville Defendants
the Opportunity to Pursue Relief
The availability of any meaningful relief for noncitizens con-
victed of criminal convictions must also be discussed in examin-
ing the propriety of judicial removal proceedings at Postville.
The 1994 and 1996 statutes reflect a desire to funnel noncitizens
convicted of aggravated felonies into proceedings that provide
expeditious adjudication and removal, and little opportunity to
present a defense to deportation. In 1994, an individual with an
aggravated felony conviction was presumed deportable. 123 In
1996, IIRIRA amendments to the INA eliminated most de-
fenses to deportation for those with aggravated felonies and se-
verely limited avenues of relief for those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude.
noncitizen can affirmatively show that the offense was committed to aid, as-
sist or abet the spouse, parent or child, is not considered an aggravated fel-
ony. I.N.A. § 101(a)(43)(P)(ii). All but five of the defendants involved in
Postville who accepted a plea agreement received a sentence of five months
for use of false documents (the sentence received by the defendants in
Postville reflects that the offense was not of sufficient severity to constitute
an aggravated felony) and certainly the reports from Postville support that
defendants had used false documents in order to support family members.
(See Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 5; see also Preston, 270
Immigrants, supra note 12.) Further, no reported circuit court decision has
specifically found that a violation of 1546(a) constitutes an aggravated felony
as defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P), I.N.A. § 101(a)(43)(P). A violation
of 1546(a) does appear to constitute a crime of "moral turpitude." See Oma-
gah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2002). But see In re Serna, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 579, 586 (BIA 1992) (holding possession of an altered immigration
document without intent to use it unlawfully is not a crime involving moral
turpitude). A crime of moral turpitude may render a noncitizen inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(a)(i), I.N.A. § 212(a)(2)(a)(i) or deportable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), I.N.A. § 237(a)(2). However, this ground of in-
admissibility or deportability would not preclude eligibility for asylum, with-
holding of removal or CAT, or adjustment of status through a lawful
permanent resident or U.S. citizen family member, which is a remedy for
which some of the Postville defendants may have been eligible.
123 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252a, I.N.A. § 242A.
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However, while conviction of an aggravated felony124 cer-
tainly limits relief in immigration proceedings, it does not pre-
clude relief. Specifically, withholding of removal and CAT
protections are still available. Additionally, significant relief
from removal from the United States is available through reme-
dies that have been enacted since the passage of the 1996 judi-
cial removal provisions, including CAT and the U nonimmigrant
visa for victims of certain crimes.125 As a practical matter, nonci-
tizens who might benefit from CAT were not provided with a
formal process for applying until 1999.126 Certainly, in 1996,
Congress could not have contemplated the ability of a federal
court sentencing judge to be able to make determinations about
CAT or the U nonimmigrant visa, nor could Congress have con-
templated that a respondent would be precluded from raising
these claims in judicial removal proceedings.
Finally, multiple provisions in the INA, designed to streamline
the process by which noncitizens with significant criminal con-
victions or those with prior immigration violations are removed
from the United States by precluding access to administrative
hearing, nevertheless provide some clear regulatory mechanisms
through which noncitizens can apply for relief under withhold-
ing of removal or CAT.127 In contrast, judicial deportation pro-
124 It should be noted also that whether a crime constitutes an aggravated
felony involves complex analysis and has been the subject of much litigation.
A search of law review articles addressing "aggravated felony" yields over
one thousand results addressing immigration consequences of crimes consid-
ered aggravated felonies, to availability of judicial review, eligibility for im-
migration remedies, violations of human rights norms in preventing
noncitizens from seeking protection based on characterization of a crime as
an aggravated felony. See also Gonzalez-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532, 535
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing whether a state drug charge constitutes a felony
drug charge, the Seventh Circuit characterized the government's analysis as
follows: "The only consistency that we can see in the government's treatment
of the meaning of 'aggravated felony' is that the alien always loses.")
125 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(U).
126 64 C.F.R. § 8478 (1999).
127 Non-lawful permanent residents with aggravated felonies subject to 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b), I.N.A. § 238(b) proceedings may request a reasonable fear
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vides no rules by which a person at risk of persecution or torture
can raise their claim.
Access to information about relief under asylum, withholding
of removal or CAT was particularly relevant for those detained
during the Postville raids. In the Postville proceedings, there was
no examination by the court or the prosecutor regarding
whether the detainees might face a significant possibility of per-
secution or torture if returned to their home country. A number
of defendants arrested in Postville were citizens of Guate-
mala.128 Between 2005 to 2007, Guatemala was among the top
ten countries whose citizens sought asylum.129 Amnesty Interna-
tional reports a grave public security situation, negligible police
accountability, high levels of violence against women, little ef-
fort "to bring to justice former military officers accused of
human rights violations, including genocide, committed during
the years of internal armed conflict (1960-1996)," and threats
and intimidation against human rights defenders. 130 According
interview. Individuals who reenter unlawfully after a final order of removal
are also allowed a reasonable fear interview with an Asylum Officer to deter-
mine eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31.
128 Lorena Lopez & Douglas Burns, After Postville raid, mystery advertiser in
Guatemala sought meatpackers: Agriprocessors denies any role in ads touting
"excellent opportunity" in Iowa, IOWA INDEP., July 28, 2008 ("'Of the 389
people caught in the U.S. Immigration Enforcement and Customs (ICE) raid,
295 were Guatemalans working at the facility,' said Tim Counts, an ICE
spokesperson.").
129 KELLY J. JEFFREYS & DANIEL C. MARTIN, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT ON
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES 2007 5 (2008) (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau
of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admis-
sions Processing System (WRAPS)). Further, citizens from Guatemala who
are members of a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of Guatemalan and
Salvadoran asylum seekers are entitled to an initial or de novo asylum inter-
view and adjudication of their claim and freedom from detention. See gener-
ally Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornborough, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal.
1989). It is possible that defendants in the Postville proceedings were de-
prived of this class protection.
130 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORTS OF 2008: HUMAN RIGHTS IN RE-
PUBLIC OF GUATEMALA (2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/re-
gion/guatemala/report-2008.
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to the State Department, serious human rights violations remain
in Guatemala, including:
[T]he government's failure to investigate and pun-
ish unlawful killings committed by members of the
security forces; widespread societal violence, in-
cluding numerous killings; corruption and substan-
tial inadequacies in the police and judicial sectors;
police involvement in kidnappings; impunity for
criminal activity; harsh and dangerous prison con-
ditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; failure of
the judicial system to ensure full and timely inves-
tigations and fair trials; failure to protect judicial
sector officials, witnesses, and civil society repre-
sentatives from intimidation; threats and intimida-
tion against journalists; discrimination and
violence against women; trafficking in persons;
discrimination against indigenous communities;
discrimination and violence against gay, transves-
tite, and transgender persons; and ineffective en-
forcement of labor laws, including child labor
provisions.131
Had ICE pursued traditional removal proceedings under INA
§ 240, rather than judicial removal orders, the Postville detain-
ees would have had to be informed of the potential for protec-
tion from harm consistent with U.S. international obligations.
This did not happen. In fact, in the plea agreement, which con-
tains a stipulated order of removal and a waiver of the right to
pursue a removal hearing before an Immigration Judge, no men-
tion is made of what remedies are available through removal
proceedings. 132 No mention is made of asylum, withholding of
removal or CAT. No mention is made of the duty of the govern-
131 See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RiGHTs PRACTICES
2007 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100641.htm
(emphasis added).
132 See Plea Agreement, supra note 9.
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ment not to return an individual to a country where there is the
possibility of harm or likelihood of persecution or torture. 33
For a defendant with a genuine fear of returning to the home
country, it is difficult to fathom how, in the course of less than
ten days between apprehension by ICE and entry of the plea,
this fear could have realistically been raised by a defendant who
was handcuffed or shackled, guarded and shuffled between the
makeshift court to other areas of the heavily secured fair-
grounds where they were being held. Those seeking asylum,
withholding or CAT may be survivors of trauma or torture with
attendant psychological symptoms. Common psychological re-
sponses include "distress at exposure to cues that symbolize or
resemble the trauma. This may include the lack of trust and fear
of persons of authority" and may include avoidance or denial of
painful topics and problems with memory and functioning. 134
Given the immigrant's experience in coming to the United
States, the symptoms of any past torture or trauma, and the fear
of revealing information when there are individuals in the
United States that may seek to harm the applicant or his or her
family members, 35 it is difficult to imagine to whom the nonci-
tizen defendant would present his fears or concerns in this situa-
tion. To the court-appointed defense attorney who represented
ten or 20 of his fellow countrymen and women and was princi-
pally charged with explaining the criminal charges and options
for a plea agreement? To the U.S. Attorney concerned with the
swift execution of plea agreements? To the federal district court
judge who held mass hearings ushering in ten defendants at a
time and entered as many as 85 pleas in one day? Even if a
defendant had articulated a fear of returning to the home coun-
try before the federal district court judge, as set forth above, it is
133 Id.
134 See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXAMINING ASYLUM SEEKERS 66
(2001).
135 See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (C.D.
Cal. 1988).
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unclear how the court would make a determination that there
was "substantial evidence to establish prima facie eligibility for
relief from removal."'136 Did the federal court judge have the ex-
pertise to recognize prima facie eligibility for relief from re-
moval? Based on Chief Judge Linda Reade's statement that
immigration lawyers "do not understand the federal criminal
process as it relates to immigration charges," 37 it would seem
that the federal court judges were concerned with the criminal
rather than the immigration aspects of the proceedings.
Finally, even if the federal court judge determined that there
was some evidence presented establishing a defense to deporta-
tion, the inquiry under the judicial removal provisions is not
complete. DHS would be required to provide the court with a
report and recommendation regarding eligibility for relief.138
Notwithstanding a prosecutor's duty to seek justice, the statu-
tory requirement that DHS provide a report and recommenda-
tion of eligibility for relief seems to present a conflict. It seems
unlikely that DHS, the party who first has sought the judicial
removal order, and in the case of Postville, worked with the U.S.
Attorney to fast-track the proceedings to ensure a speedy con-
viction and stipulated removal order, would present a report or
recommendation establishing eligibility for relief from removal.
Postville marks yet another chapter in agency history of coerc-
ing or otherwise preventing noncitizens from Central America
from pursuing asylum or other legal protections in the United
States. ICE's predecessor, INS, was found to have engaged in
discriminatory and coercive practices in preventing
Guatemalans and Salvadorans from pursuing asylum in the past.
In 1989, Guatemalans and Salvadorans brought forth a class ac-
tion lawsuit in part based on the discriminatory practices in ad-
judicating asylum applications resulting in approval rates for
136 8 U.S.C. § 1228, I.N.A. § 238.
137 Preston, 270 Immigrants, supra note 12.
138 I.N.A. § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
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only 3% for Salvadorans and under 1% for Guatemalans.139 Be-
ginning in 1982, and as recently as 2007, a federal district court
in California upheld provisions of a permanent injunction
against legacy INS because INS officers "regularly pressured
Salvadorans to return to El Salvador" and mistreated, pressured
and intimidated Salvadorans "into giving up their asylum
claims." 40 In Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, the court found
that there was not sufficient evidence that coercive practices had
been remedied by DHS.141 The comparisons between the condi-
tions and practices enjoined in Orantes and the practices used in
Postville are apparent. In Orantes, the court recognized the par-
ticular egregiousness of the practice of encouraging Salvadorans
in detention centers to waive their rights to a hearing and appli-
cation for asylum, given the limited access to counsel.142 Simi-
larly, the Agriprocessors employees detained at the National
Cattle Congress also had extremely limited access to immigra-
tion attorneys. While it has not been established that the prose-
cutors, DHS or the judiciary intended to preclude individuals
from pursuing protection in the United States, by all accounts
the legal proceedings at Postville contained no consideration of
the United States's obligations under the U.N. Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees or CAT and the proceedings
echoed of past practices that prevented bona fide asylum seek-
ers from a hearing and an opportunity to be provided with safe
haven.
139 Am. Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 765.
140 See Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 504 F. Supp. 2d 825, 833 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
141 Id. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1504, aff'd by
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
142 See Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 860-61.
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II. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IN THE
POSTVILLE PROCEEDINGS
Notwithstanding international obligations, by turning criminal
proceedings into a hybrid immigration proceeding, the raids in
Postville set a dangerous precedent with respect to the role of
the federal judiciary. Descriptions of the judicial process em-
ployed at Postville raise difficult constitutional questions, espe-
cially regarding whether the judiciary maintained its impartiality
and independence.
The federal statute creating the hybrid criminal/immigration
proceeding used in Postville undermines the federal judiciary's
independence and caused the federal courts to act more as an
arm for enforcement than as an adjudicative body tasked with
deciding a case or controversy. This problem was magnified by
the court's extraordinarily close cooperation with the FBI and
ICE, which played a crucial role in the administration of the
raid. The close cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office and
subsequent decisions to move the court and its personnel to a
detention compound also seriously undermined the judiciary's
obligation to remain impartial.
Separation of Powers Issues
The importance of an independent judiciary is not restricted
to concerns over the due process rights of individuals who go
before a judge or adjudicator. A strong independent judiciary
was one of the core concepts adopted by the Framers of the
United States Constitution, and a key component in balancing
the three separate branches of government. When an individual
is tried by a judge or adjudicator who has an individual interest
or perceived bias in how a case will turn out, the fairness of the
individual proceeding is threatened. However, if the federal ju-
diciary is forced to side with one party (especially the Govern-
ment) via legislative fiat, and is given no effective power to
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decide a case or controversy before it, then the legitimacy of the
entire judicial branch is threatened. The statute authorizing the
transformation of a criminal trial into a quasi-immigration pro-
ceeding represents an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
undermine the independence and legitimacy of the federal
judiciary.
Judicial independence has been enshrined in many different
forms in the Constitution. The lifetime tenure and salary clauses
are obvious constitutional examples that prevent either Con-
gress or the President from interfering with the role of the judi-
ciary. However, the structure of Article III, and the power of
judicial review also serve as powerful examples of separation of
powers and the importance of judicial independence. 143 The con-
nection between an immigration raid in Iowa and a threat
against Article III independence is not obvious at first glance.
However, an examination of the procedural and statutory
framework used in the raid brings into focus why Postville may
impact more than the rights of potential defendants and expose
a constitutional dilemma.
Judicial independence can mean many things. It can refer to
institutional independence, such as lifetime tenure, or indepen-
dence from political forces, such as public opinion or elections.
However, one type of independence that is rarely mentioned
but which goes to the heart of the judiciary can be referred to as
"decisional independence."' 144 Decisional independence stems
from Article III's "cases and controversies" clause.145 Neither
143 Academia is replete with discussions of judicial independence and no ref-
erence would do the subject justice. Nevertheless, the following articles may
help the reader understand the issues of judicial independence and separa-
tion of powers. See generally Michael G. Collins, Judicial Independence and
the Scope of Article III-A view from the Federalist, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 675
(2003); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence:
Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995).
144 See generally Redish, supra note 143.
145 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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the legislative nor executive branch can interfere with the judici-
ary's duty to decide a particular case or controversy that is
before the judge.
The principle of decisional independence was first articulated
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Klein.146 In Klein, the
Court held that whatever broad powers Congress has, it may not
directly dictate a result for a case that is before the federal judi-
ciary.147 So how can we recognize when Congress has turned the
federal judiciary into a rubber stamp court?
There are two obvious, though certainly not exhaustive means
to gauge whether a legislative action has improperly decided a
case or prevented the judiciary from deciding a case before it.
Congress cannot give jurisdiction to a federal court and then
prevent that same court from deciding factual or legal issues
that go to the heart of deciding the case before it. Secondly, the
judiciary's decision in a case must have some actual effect. The
decision must, in fact, decide a case or controversy, and the judi-
ciary is not to be used as an advisory panel. The statute that
Agriprocessors employees were prosecuted under in Postville
arguably violates both such principles and therefore jeopardized
federal judicial decision-making independence.
146 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). This post Civil War case had to
do with how to treat presidential pardons. Despite a previous ruling that
interpreted a presidential pardon as forcing the government to treat the
pardoned as if they never committed a crime, Congress passed a law that
stated that presidential pardons were "proof of prior disloyalty" and required
the federal courts to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any claims to property
that had been seized during the war. In a confusing decision, the Supreme
Court ruled Congress had violated separation of powers, both by forcing the
Supreme Court to reinterpret the effect of presidential pardons, and by using
Congress' power over jurisdiction to dictate the results of individual cases.
Congress was allowed to prevent all recovery of seized properties and could
have prevented jurisdiction for any claim on seized property, but could not
do either if it interfered with the court's ability to decide the specific case or
controversy.
147 Id. at 146.
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The statutory framework used to deport the vast majority of
the people arrested in the Postville raids comes from 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(c). As noted earlier, this statutory framework was never
intended to be used against people who had not been convicted
of serious crimes as it was in Postville. However, even if Con-
gress did intend the statute to be used in a raid such as Postville,
Congress nevertheless overstepped its legislative role and im-
properly interfered with the judiciary's ability to independently
decide cases.
Preventing the Federal Judiciary from Deciding Many Forms
of Relief From Removal Unconstitutionally Restricts
Key Legal Issues from Consideration
Has Congress interfered with the Judiciary's ability to decide
cases? Keeping in mind the legal principles established in Klein,
if a federal judge is restricted from deciding essential facts or
legal issues necessary for issuing a removal order, then Congress
has impermissibly affected the judiciary's constitutional duty to
properly decide a case. The statute allows for a hearing and evi-
dence to be presented to show whether or not a person may be
deportable. Arguably, the federal judge's fact-finding function
seems unrestricted. But are there restrictions in determining key
legal issues? The answer may depend entirely on the phrase in
the statute that allows the federal judge to "either grant or deny
the relief sought."148
Reading 8 U.S.C. § 1228 without reference to any other immi-
gration sections might give the impression that the only substan-
tive determination that is needed to decide whether someone
should be ordered removed from the United States is a ruling on
whether or not a person is deportable. However, a finding of
deportability is only the first step and does not always lead to a
deportation or removal order, and in some circumstances a de-
portable person can gain lawful permanent status in the United
148 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C).
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States.149 Because eligibility for relief is essential in deciding
whether an order of removal should ultimately be issued, the
question becomes, does the federal judiciary have the jurisdic-
tion to decide questions of relief from removal?
As relief from removal is essential to determining whether or
not a person should be ordered deported, a reading consistent
with the judiciary's constitutional role would imply that a fed-
eral judge has the power to decide eligibility for forms of relief,
such as asylum, cancellation of removal and adjustment of sta-
tus. However, despite the seemingly broad grant of power by
"shall grant or deny the relief sought,"'150 the nature of immigra-
tion relief in general makes it highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended to give the federal judiciary any ability to grant or deny
many, if not most, forms of relief from removal.
Many forms of relief, such as cancellation of removal, adjust-
ment of status, and asylum, are statutorily defined as within the
discretion of the Attorney General. 51 Relief cannot normally be
granted without the Attorney General's (or his delegates') ap-
proval, and it is not clear whether the phrase "shall grant" con-
fers enough authority for a federal judge to bypass entire
procedures (and in some cases entire agency bodies) to grant
relief if a defendant warrants it. Bolstering the argument that
Congress did not intend for a federal judge to have the ability to
grant or deny discretionary forms of relief is the fact that Con-
gress made the Attorney General's decisions to grant or deny
relief immune from judicial review.152 It would be odd for Con-
gress to protect the Attorney General's discretion from review
by federal courts, but then allow a federal judge to grant relief
independent from any approval from the Attorney General.
149 Some forms of relief such as asylum, cancellation of removal (for LPRs
and non-LPRs), adjustment of status, VAWA cancellation, and U-Visa are all
forms of relief that can be used to prevent an order of removal being entered,
even if the person is found to be deportable.
150 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C).
151 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b), 1255, 1158(b)(1)(A).
152 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(2)(B).
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This is not to say that the relief portion of the statute has no
teeth whatsoever. As noted earlier, there are forms of relief that
fall outside of the discretion of the Attorney General, including
protections under CAT. However, the fact that a federal judge
can grant some form of relief from removal does not cure the
deficiency that the court is prevented from deciding key legal
questions necessary in the context of a person's ability to stay in
the United States.
The Commissioner's involvement does not cure this difficulty.
The judicial removal statute requires input from the Commis-
sioner,153 but does not detail how a federal judge is to treat the
Commissioner's advice. If read as advisory, the federal judge's
decision to grant relief could conceivably be done in contraven-
tion of the Attorney General's discretion, which would directly
contradict the plain language of the statute defining the relief
available as under the Attorney General's complete discretion.
However, if the advice is read as mandatory, then the federal
judge is restricted from independently deciding important legal
issues, thus violating separation of powers.
If a federal judge is not allowed to independently grant or
decide many forms of relief from removal, then the court is pre-
vented from deciding a key legal issue essential to the case or
controversy the court has jurisdiction to decide. Asking a fed-
eral judge to order removal but preventing the same judge from
considering bases of relief from removal that a person may be
otherwise eligible for renders the process nearly meaningless
and unconstitutionally abrogates the judiciary's decision-making
authority.
153 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C).
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Rendering the Federal Judge's Decision Without Effect
Violates the Case or Controversy Clause.
Aside from preventing a federal judge from deciding a key
legal issue, Congress acts unconstitutionally if it renders a fed-
eral judge's decision meaningless or without effect.15 4 But that
may be exactly what happens when a federal judge declines to
issue an order of removal. If a federal judge finds a defendant
deportable and consequently issues an order of removal, the
court's decision has considerable weight and effect. After serv-
ing his or her criminal sentence, the defendant will have an or-
der of removal entered against him or her and be physically
removed from the United States. But what happens if the fed-
eral judge, after considering all the evidence, decides that the
defendant is not deportable and thus not subject to a judicial
order of removal? Under 8 U.S.C. § 1228, the Attorney General
is not precluded from re-deciding the exact same issues in a sep-
arate hearing, and does not appear to be restricted in any way
by the federal judge's decision.' 1 Essentially, if a federal judge
finds in favor of the defendant, the Attorney General can ignore
the decision, find the person deportable and issue a removal or-
der. Moreover, because of the restrictions on both injunctive re-
lief and appellate jurisdiction, no federal court may have the
chance to review the Attorney General's decision. Essentially,
Congress has allowed a scenario which renders a federal court's
decision without meaning.156 Such action violates the heart of
the Case or Controversy Clause and relegates the federal judici-
154 See generally United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128.
155 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(4).
156 Professor Gerald Neuman makes a similar observation: "Read literally,
this means that a federal district court's holding that an alien is not deport-
able does not preclude the Attorney General from deporting the alien on the
same ground. In other words, it would allow the court to rule against the
alien, but would deny res judicata effect to a ruling in the alien's favor. This
would not only be a biased enforcement procedure, but would probably vio-
late Article III of the Constitution." Neuman, supra note 98, at 1408.
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ary to the role of an advisor or, even worse, only gives effect to
the judge's ruling when the ruling is against the defendant.
What role did these statutes play in the deportation of the
Agriprocessors defendants? By the authority granted under 8
U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5), the federal prosecutors offered plea deals
that asked the defendants to waive their hearing on de-
portability by the federal judge and to agree to a removal order
from the United States.157 The defendants were all presented
with a choice. 5 8 They could either reject the plea offer and take
a chance on the procedures as outlined earlier in this section, or
they could accept the removal offer with the hopes of shortening
their time in federal confinement.159 But if the process that the
defendants were asked to waive offered no avenue of relief,
then it is no wonder that none of the defendants rejected the
plea offers and took their chances in front of a judge.
Imagine an Agriprocessors defendant from Guatemala who is
married to a United States citizen and who may have a chance
for relief from removal if he was brought before an immigration
judge under the normal deportation proceedings. The federal
prosecutor offers a plea deal and tells the defendant, "If you
want a hearing in front of the federal judge on your deportation
you can have it. But if you sign this deal, you can skip all that
and probably get out six months faster." The defense attorney
would have to tell the defendant (1) the federal judge may not
have the power to grant any relief from removal even though
the defendant may be eligible, and (2) even if the federal judge
decides the case in the defendant's favor, immigration authori-
ties can ignore the judge and bring the defendant to another
immigration hearing and decide again if the defendant should be
deported. When facing this type of choice, there is little doubt
that there is no choice at all. By asking the federal judiciary to
oversee a process that offered defendants no reasonable avenue
157 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 5.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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of relief, Congress and the federal prosecutors undermined the
judiciary's role in making independent rulings on the cases
before the court.
Impartial Judiciary
One of the backbones of the modern judicial system is the
notion that adjudicators and judges should be impartial and in-
dependent. This bedrock principle has been part of the Ameri-
can and British Common Law tradition for centuries and dates
back to the Magna Carta and to the original state constitu-
tions.160 It became ensconced into the Constitution as part of the
due process rights granted under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 161 The principle of judicial independence applies
to both criminal and civil proceedings and the Supreme Court
has continually held that an "impartial adjudicator" is an essen-
tial part of procedural due process. 162
That an adjudicator cannot be biased for or against the parties
before him or her, or have a direct interest in how a case is de-
cided, is fairly uncontroversial. However, the Supreme Court
has also made clear that even the mere appearance of bias or
party allegiance is a violation of due process. 163 In some cases, it
is the appearance of bias that is most problematic, as it has the
160 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXIX ("It is the right of every citi-
zen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of
humanity will admit.").
161 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that, under the 5th and
14th Amendments, due process requires that adjudicators acting in judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity must not have an interest in conviction).
162 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 271 (1970); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an
impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This re-
quirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two cen-
tral concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or
mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by
affected individuals in the decision-making process.").
163 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-38 (1955).
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potential to "cast doubt on the integrity of the whole
process."164
The Constitution protects against the appearance of bias in
many different ways. For instance, the prohibition on ex parte
communication, or communication between the adjudicator and
only one party in the controversy, is designed to prevent the
suggestion that one party is being favored in secret. 165 Other ex-
amples of deprivations of due process because of the appear-
ance of bias have come in the forms of prejudicial jury
selections,166 violations of ethical codes that prevented judges
from speaking publicly on disputed or controversial political is-
sues,167 and perhaps relevant to the Postville proceedings, due
process violations that occur when a judge acts as both the judge
and the prosecutor. 168
Judicial Interest in Defendants Taking Pleas for Postville
The appearance of impartiality is essential to the integrity and
stability of all judicial proceedings. In trying the Postville detain-
ees, the Northern District of Iowa made some unusual decisions
that gave the appearance that the judiciary preferred plea deals
to adjudicating over 300 criminal trials.
One of the most striking facts of the Postville raid is that the
Northern District Court of Iowa did not hold the proceedings in
their normal courtrooms in Cedar Rapids or Sioux City, but in-
stead took the judges, magistrates, and judicial staff to the Na-
tional Cattle Congress, a giant compound used to host fairs and
large events, in Waterloo, Iowa.169 Setting aside for the moment
164 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).
165 Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1984); United States. v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 459 (1978).
166 Peters, 407 U.S. at 502.
167 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002).
168 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
169 See Lynda Waddington, Postville Aftermath: 302 Detainees Charged Crim-
inally, 297 Plead Guilty, IOWA INDEP., May 22, 2008, http://iowaindependent.
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the impropriety of moving the judiciary miles away from its
home location in order to expedite prosecution, the massive
amount of preparation and logistical hurdles involved in making
this move can create a sense of impropriety and improper inter-
est in the results of the raid. In fact, in describing the "success"
of the Postville raid, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Iowa Matt Dummermuth credited "the dedication, expertise
and around-the-clock work during the last two weeks of the
people involved, including employees from my office, from all of
the participating law enforcement agencies and from the federal
court. "170
Preserving the appearance of impartiality becomes difficult
when the judiciary makes logistical concessions and coordinates
directly with the federal prosecution long before the defendants
are even aware that prosecution may be taking place. Interpret-
ers were hired for the Postville raid a month before the actual
raid.171 It is also certainly clear that in order to move the judges
and the personnel and rent the space required for the judicial
staff, extensive preparation was needed and required coordina-
tion between the government prosecutors and the judiciary.
While normally logistical cooperation may not rise to create a
sense of partiality or bias, what occurred at Postville went far
beyond mere logistics. The district court moved personnel more
than 50 miles away from the courthouse, ratified plea deals
com/2366/postville-aftermath-302-detainees-charged-criminally-297-plead-
guilty (last visited Jan. 8, 2009); Nat'l Cattle Congress, http://www.national
cattlecongress.com/ncc-bldg/ncc-bldg-layout.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
170 Id. (emphasis added). We recognize that every court and adjudicator has
an interest in a smooth-running docket. However, it should also be true that
the courts should be prepared and at least have the actual capacity to have
heard each and every case if all the defendants had insisted on a trial. Given
the logistical nightmare of moving an entire federal district court far from its
home, and the housing situation, it is not clear that the court could have
heard these cases at trial, and the question has to be asked whether the
court's own knowledge of its capacities gave rise to an appearance that the
court itself had no interest in having criminal trials go forward.
171 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 1.
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before defense attorneys even spoke to their clients, and partici-
pated in the very plea deals that the judges would later have to
accept or reject for each individual case. 72 The impression that
the federal court had an interest in the timely completion of the
proceedings and in pleas rather than trials can hardly be
disputed.
The amount of resources, including time, money and person-
nel involved in the operation of the raids reflected the prosecu-
tion's preference that the adjudications and removal of more
than 300 detainees move quickly and without disruption. Plea
deals were prepared beforehand with the participation of the
federal court and a system was worked out to coordinate how
best to expedite the cases involved. 173 Most of the detainees
were threatened or charged with aggravated identity theft, a
federal crime that carries serious penalties.174 Time was a huge
factor in these cases, and it became clear that the federal prose-
cutors needed the majority of cases to be settled in pleas. The
DOJ and ICE were both on the hook for the continued deten-
tion of the defendants, and the mere prospect of going to trial
on nearly 300 cases, with very little actual evidence of "intent," a
requirement of the crime, was a daunting prospect. But the
motivations of the DOJ and ICE do not give rise in this case to
constitutional concerns about due process.
What is of constitutional importance is that the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa had an interest, and a clear preference, in not hold-
ing 300 criminal trials that would stymie the operations of the
entire judiciary in the area. The Northern District of Iowa had
172 See Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3, at 28-29.
173 Id.
174 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). This particular crime is under scrutiny as there
is a circuit split over the level and type of intent that needs to be shown to
support the conviction. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 274 Fed. Appx.
501 (8th Cir. 2008) (cert. granted Oct. 8, 2008, No. 08-108). The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether a conviction under the aggravated
identity theft statute requires knowledge that the document belonged to an-
other person.
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enormous short-term dockets following the raid, and according
to one report, court sessions went from 7 a.m. until midnight. 175
Moreover, the trailers used for the courthouse and for the de-
tention of the defendants cost money. It is likely that the regular
routine of the Northern District Court of Iowa itself was dis-
rupted.176 It is not clear how the court's normal dockets were
being handled during this time, but it is unlikely that other liti-
gants were asked to come to the National Cattle Congress to
have their cases heard. While a press release by the District
Court attempted to reassure the public that relocation would
not substantially affect normal relations, it is difficult to see how
that could be true if in fact the cases went to trial.177 This single
immigration raid required not only a vast amount of resources
from the DOJ and ICE, but also from the federal judiciary. The
court had enormous incentives to not have a substantial number
of defendants pursue their right to a criminal trial.
Did the judicial staff have another plan in place if all 300 plus
defendants decided to go forward to trial? Where and how
would those trials have taken place? If logistics compelled the
court to move the personnel over 50 miles away from their
home courtrooms for preliminary hearings, what would have
been required of the court had each of the Agriprocessors work-
ers insisted on trial? While judicial economy is a valid considera-
tion, due process rights cannot be sacrificed in the name of
judicial efficiency.7 8 Even if the judiciary acted without any bias
or self-interest, it is difficult to argue that at least the appear-
ance of impropriety was not created.
175 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 2.
176 A press release from the U.S. Attorney's office indicates that the court
appearances stopped at 6 p.m. and resumed again at 10 p.m. Press Release,
U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Iowa, Postville Criminal Arrests
Rise to 154 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ian/press/
May_08/514 -08_Agriprocessors.html.
177 Press Release, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa (May
12, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. District Court], available at http://
www.aila.org/Content/default.aspx?docid=25440.
178 See author's discussion, supra note 170.
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Further creating the appearance of bias was the level of com-
munication between the judiciary and the prosecution. As re-
ported by the press and Dr. Camayd-Freixas, the prosecution
and the enforcement agencies were in communication with the
Northern District Court for the coordination of the raids and
the housing of the detainees. 179 Notably, it has been alleged that
Chief Judge Linda Reade approved plea deals arranged by the
federal prosecutors even before criminal defense attorneys had
a chance to review the documents with their clients, and even
attended plea deal meetings in contravention of Federal Rule
11.180 The simple presence of Judge Reade at any of the plea
conferences causes the appearance of bias in favor of settle-
ment. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney's acknowledgment that
the District Court played a role in the success of the operation
further creates the impression that the court was not impartial at
all.
One clear example of how close cooperation in the adminis-
tration of the raid created unintended impressions of bias can be
found in the press release that was issued by the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa shortly following the raid.181 The press release was
intended to announce that many of the court personnel were to
be moved to Waterloo. Despite using convenience to the detain-
ees' families as a reason to move the court personnel, the clerk
of the court acknowledged the "inadequate space in the Cedar
Rapids and Sioux City courthouses to hold and process those
arrested."182 Moreover, the language used in the press release
showed that at least some members of the judicial staff, includ-
ing the Chief Judge, had preconceived notions of some of the
179 See generally Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 1; Letter
from Rockne Cole, supra note 3.
180 Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3 ("What I find most astonishing is
that apparently Chief Judge Linda Reade had already ratified these deals prior
to one lawyer talking to his or her client. Judge Reade's presence at the meet-
ing seemed to confirm as much.").
181 Press Release, U.S. District Court, supra note 178.
182 Id.
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key facts that were at issue in the cases before the court. The
press release states that the move to Waterloo was "in response
to the anticipated arrest and prosecution of numerous illegal
aliens."'183 Obviously, the legal status of those arrested was an
issue that should not have been assumed prior to any arrest or
hearing. This press release, which acknowledges a concession to
logistics and assumes a material fact prior to hearing, creates an
impression of bias and judicial interest in how the cases would
be heard and decided. 184 While seemingly innocuous, any im-
pression that causes the legitimacy of the process to be called
into question makes it much more difficult to evaluate whether
due process was afforded to those arrested in Postville.
What cannot be forgotten is the fact that many of the people
forced to go through this process did not speak English and
likely had only passing familiarity with the U.S. judicial sys-
tem.185 It was likely difficult for some defendants, many who
were native Guatemalans, to distinguish the judicial staff from
the enforcement and prosecution staff. In order to function
properly, the judiciary has an obligation to make reasonable ef-
forts to ensure that defendants understand that the court is inde-
pendent from the prosecution and will approach the case in an
impartial manner. If the defendants were under the impression
that the judiciary was neither impartial nor independent, then
any decision to accept plea deals was not a valid waiver of con-
stitutional rights.
183 Id. (emphasis added).
184 The attorney for one of the Postville defendants filed a motion for recusal
of Chief Judge Diane Reade based on this press release and other statements
made by the District Court and Chief Judge Diane Reade that tend to show
bias. Amy Lorentzen, Judge Declines to Step Down from Immigration Case,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2008.
185 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 2, 4.
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11. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL/
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
In addition to the behavior of the federal district court during
the Postville proceedings, serious questions regarding the basic
procedural rights of individuals similarly need to be addressed in
light of Postville. In the criminal context, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees an individual the right to counsel, and, inherent in
that right, competent and conflict-free counsel.186 This section
will highlight the lack of protections afforded to the Postville
detainees who were subjected to removal as part of an inept and
coercive criminal proceeding.
The Right to Competent Counsel
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States provides, in relevant part, that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence."'18 7 The Constitutional right to "assis-
tance of counsel" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
"the right to the effective assistance of counsel."188 In Strickland
v. Washington, the Court reasoned "[t]hat a person who happens
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however,
is not enough to satisfy the Constitutional [requirement].89
Specifically, the Court has concluded that the right to counsel
includes the right to "competent" counsel.1 90 In recognizing the
importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the
Court noted that the Sixth Amendment "envisions counsel's
playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial sys-
186 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 685-86 (1984); Holloway v. Ar-
kansas, 425 U.S. 475 (1978).
187 U.S. CONST. amend VI (emphasis added).
188 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
189 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
190 Id.
Volume 2, Number I fPall 2-008
56
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol2/iss1/5
Re-interpreting Postville
tem to produce just results who plays the role necessary to
ensure that the trial is fair." 191
So, what can be discerned of the competence of counsel in the
Postville proceedings? It has been revealed that during the
course of the jail interviews, the criminal defense attorneys had
no choice but to recommend the plea being offered by the U.S.
Attorney, counseling their clients that:
If you plead not guilty, you could wait in jail 6 to 8
months for a trial (without right of bail since you
are on an immigration detainer). Even if you win
at trial, you will still be deported and could end up
waiting longer in jail than if you just pled guilty.192
However, most of these criminal defense attorneys were unfa-
miliar with immigration laws, and immigration attorneys were
denied access to the makeshift detention camp. 193 An under-
standing of immigration laws indicates that an individual will not
necessarily "still be deported" at the end of a trial. While crimi-
nal convictions make obtaining relief more difficult, they do not
preclude relief from deportation. Could the detainees' decision
to plead guilty have been based on immigration advice that
couldn't possibly have been rendered with any degree of
competence?
One specific case referenced by Dr. Camayd-Freixas in his es-
say, "Interpreting after the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A
Personal Account," highlights the extent to which these clients
may have been ill-advised.
Another client, a young Mexican ... had worked
at the plant for ten years and had two American
born daughters, a 2-year-old and a newborn. He
had a good case with Immigration for an adjust-
ment of status which would allow him to stay. But
191 Id.
192 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting (emphasis added), supra note 3, at 5.
193 Id. at 7.
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if he took the Plea Agreement, he would lose that
chance and face deportation as a felon convicted
of a crime of 'moral turpitude.' On the other hand,
if he pled 'not guilty' he had to wait several
months in jail for trial, and risk getting a 2-year
sentence. After an agonizing decision, he con-
cluded that he had to take the 5-month deal and
deportation, because as he put it, 'I cannot be
away from my children for so long.' His case was
complicated; it needed research in immigration
law, a change in the Plea Agreement, and above
all, more time. 194
This man's decision to take the plea agreement has clearly es-
tablished immigration consequences. The plea is a criminal con-
viction, which renders this young man inadmissible to the
United States. This means that he cannot return to become a
lawful permanent resident without a waiver of inadmissibility,
which is a complicated and difficult "pardon" to obtain, espe-
cially in light of the fact that he must apply through the U.S.
Consulate abroad where there is no independent judicial re-
view. 195 More importantly, however, the plea agreement en-
tailed a stipulation to summary deportation. Consequently, this
man must wait outside the United States for at least ten years
before he can apply for legal permanent resident status with this
difficult waiver.196 This single decision will forcibly separate this
young man from his family for a period of at least ten years,
potentially forcing his family to return to Mexico with him. Was
194 Id. at 6-7.
195 I.N.A. § 212(h).
196 I.N.A. § 212 indicates that "any alien who (I) has been ordered removed
under section 240 or any other provision of law, and who seeks admission
within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal ... is inad-
missible." I.N.A. § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I). The same statute section renders per-
manently inadmissible "any alien convicted of ... a crime involving moral
turpitude" unless they can qualify for an extreme hardship waiver. I.N.A.
§§ 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 212(h).
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he apprised of these consequences in the course of his legal "ad-
vice?" Was his counsel competent to advise him of the full
ramifications of his legal plea? Would the client have accepted
the criminal plea bargain had the consequences of the entirety
of the plea been properly explained to him-namely, that he
and his United States citizen family face indefinite separation?
A guilty plea cannot be attacked based on inadequate legal
advice without a showing of serious attorney error and
prejudice. 197 But what about in criminal proceedings that hinge
on the defendants' understanding of their immigration case?
Further, the American Bar Association's Standard for Criminal
Justice advises that "if a defendant will face deportation as a
result of a conviction, defense counsel 'should fully advise the
client of these consequences.' 198 While deportation is said to be
merely a collateral consequence of criminal proceedings, courts
have nonetheless held that affirmative misadvice concerning im-
migration consequences that induces a criminal plea is ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 199 A plea
under these circumstances can be characterized as involuntary
or unintelligent under the Strickland standard.2 0 These deci-
sions are all the more salient in light of the fact that criminal
counsel in Postville engaged in direct immigration counseling as
compelled by the nature of these combined proceedings.201
197 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
198 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001) (citing ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, 14-3.2, Comment 75 (2d ed. 1982)).
199 See generally United States v. Cuoto, 311 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir. 2002);
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005); Downs-Morgan v.
United States, 765 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985).
200 Cuoto, 311 F.3d at 188 (stating, "We believe an affirmative misrepresen-
tation by counsel as to deportation consequences of a guilty plea is. . . objec-
tively unreasonable. We therefore hold that such a misrepresentation meets
the first prong of the Strickland test. It follows that if the defendant can also
establish that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial,' . . . then, the guilty plea is invalid.").
201 Much has been made of the Attorney General's (AG) recent decision in
Matter of Compean, 24 I & N Dec. 710, 710 (A.G. 2009) wherein the AG
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Moreover, what can be made of the government's behavior in
denying defendants proper immigration counsel at Postville?
The Court has held that the "[g]overnment violates the right to
effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the
ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to
conduct the defense. 20 2 By denying immigration attorneys ac-
cess to the Postville detainees, did the government interfere with
appointed counsel's ability to make an independent and compe-
tent decision regarding how to conduct the defense? In his letter
to Congresswoman Lofgren, Rockne Cole, a criminal defense
attorney who declined an appointment as defense counsel to the
Postville detainees, explained that the seven days that the prose-
cution gave defendants to accept the guilty pleas did not give the
defendants sufficient time to determine if the plea was in their
best interest.23 While a typical plea offer remains available for
approximately two weeks, under the fast-track program the of-
fer was only available for one week. 2°4 By allowing only seven
days to accept the terms of the plea, and denying competent im-
migration counsel access to the facility, did the government in-
terfere with court-appointed counsel's ability to effectively
determined that "[a]liens in removal proceedings also have no right to coun-
sel, including Government-appointed counsel, under the Fifth Amendment.
Although the Fifth Amendment applies to removal proceedings, its guaran-
tee of due process does not include a general right to counsel, or a specific
right to effective assistance of counsel, and is violated only by state action,
namely, action that can be legally attributed to the Government." Compean,
however, references exclusively proceedings "before an immigration judge"
under I.N.A. § 240 and defined under I.N.A. § 292. Id. at 731. The Postville
proceedings were criminal proceedings that employed immigration conse-
quences as a means of expediting plea agreements. Moreover, the authority
for such plea agreements can be found at I.N.A. § 238, a provision not refer-
enced in the Compean decision.
202 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
203 Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3.
204 See generally Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act:
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (state-
ment of Paul Charlton) [hereinafter PROTECT Act U.S.S.C. Hearings],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm; Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting,
supra note 3, at 7.
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investigate appropriate criminal or immigration defenses to the
criminal and removal issues?
The Right to Conflict-free Counsel
The right to effective assistance of counsel is also implicated
when attorneys engage in dual representation and a conflict may
arise. The Supreme Court has reasoned that dual representation
is constitutionally suspect because it prevents the attorney from
fully representing the interests of his or her client.205 The Court
has held that this conflict can deprive a defendant of his or her
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.206 In
Postville, on average, court-appointed counsel was required to
represent 17 detainees brought up on charges arising out of the
same criminal investigation.27 The plea agreements signed by
the Postville detainees stipulated that the "defendant agrees to
fully and completely cooperate in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of criminal activity. The defendant will truthfully answer all
questions, provide all evidence in defendant's control and will
not withhold any information." 208 Each detainee was required to
cooperate fully with the investigation in providing information
against the employer and, quite likely, against each other. Yet
there was no complaint from counsel that a conflict might exist.
Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether a conflict of in-
terest existed in the immigration context because, as mentioned
previously, appointed counsel had no understanding of immigra-
tion law to determine the context in which these conflicts arise.
The Eighth Circuit, the circuit under which this makeshift dis-
trict court operated, sets out a very high standard to which both
court and counsel are accountable for conflicts.20 9 Recognizing
205 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978).
206 See generally Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1978).
207 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 7.
208 Plea Agreement, supra note 9.
209 United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 111 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added).
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that "dual representation is fraught with the risk of conflict and
should be approached with caution by the parties and by coun-
sel," in United States v. Lawriw the Eighth Circuit held that "re-
sponsibility for avoiding such risks lies heavily both with the trial
court and with counsel."210 Moreover, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure are clear as to the duty of the Court under
such circumstances.
The Court must promptly inquire about the pro-
priety of joint representation and must personally
advise each defendant of the right to the effective
assistance of counsel, including separate represen-
tation. Unless there is good cause to believe no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court must
take appropriate measures to protect each defen-
dant's right to counsel.211
Were the Postville detainees apprised of their right to have con-
flict-free, competent counsel? In his letter to Congresswoman
Lofgren, Rockne Cole articulated that under the circumstances,
"it would have been impossible to meaningfully assess conflict
of interest issues in seven days." 212 Yet, under the facts that we
have, it seems clear the district court never inquired as to the
possibility of a conflict in not simply "dual" representation, but
in the representation of approximately 17 defendants in the
same criminal prosecution.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN THE
POSTVILLE PROCEEDINGS
The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
210 Id.
211 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2)(emphasis added).
212 Letter from Rockne Cole, supra note 3.
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and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that jus-
tice shall be done ... [the United States Attorney]
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrong-
ful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.213
The Impropriety of Fast-Tracking
In order to enable the expeditious processing of over 300 de-
tainees, federal prosecutors utilized a process called "fast-track-
ing," among other inappropriate discretionary measures. Fast-
tracking is designed to be a unique process wherein prosecutors
may opt for a less severe sentence or less severe charge, thereby
departing from the United States Sentencing Guidelines and
agency policy, so long as the defendant agrees to expeditiously
plead guilty. The program was presented to the Unites States
Sentencing Committee as one that is "properly reserved for ex-
ceptional circumstances, such as where the resources of a district
would otherwise be significantly strained by a persistently large
volume of a particular category of cases." 214 It was never con-
templated to have been utilized as it was in Postville.
Fast-tracking was officially sanctioned by Congress with the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploita-
tion of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act), which gave the
Attorney General unfettered discretion in implementing a fast-
tracking program. 215 Pursuant to this statute, former Attorney
General Ashcroft issued two policy memoranda from the Office
213 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
214 PROTECT Act U.S. Sentencing Comm. (USSC) Hearings (emphasis ad-
ded), supra note 204, at 14.
215 PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(B) (stating that "the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission shall ... promulgate . . . a policy statement authorizing a
downward departure of not more than 4 levels if the Government files a mo-
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of the Attorney General.21 6 The first memorandum delineates
the responsibility of the prosecutor to "charge and to pursue the
most serious, readily provable offense."217 The latter memoran-
dum laid out both the criteria sufficient to warrant the authori-
zation of a "fast-track" program as well as the procedural
requirements necessary for a grant from the Attorney General
himself.218 Specifically, in order to obtain Attorney General au-
thorization to implement a "fast-track" program, the U.S. Attor-
ney must submit a proposal that demonstrates the following:
(A) (1) the district confronts an exceptionally
large number of a specific class of offenses
within the district, and failure to handle such
cases on an expedited or "fast-track" basis
would significantly strain prosecutorial and
judicial resources available in the district; or
(2) the district confronts some other excep-
tional local circumstance with respect to a
specific class of cases that justifies expedited
disposition of such cases;
tion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized
by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney .... 1.
216 Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General on Dep't Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sen-
tencing to All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-ag-516.htm; Memorandum from
the Office of the Attorney General on Dep't Principles for Implementing an
Expedited Disposition on "Fast-Track" Prosecution Program in a District to
All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03 ag.516.htm.
217 Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General on Dep't Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sen-
tencing to All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-ag-516.htm.
218 Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General on Dep't Princi-
ples for Implementing an Expedited Disposition on "Fast-Track" Prosecution
Program in a District to All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-ag-516.htm.
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(B) declination of such cases in favor of state
prosecution is either unavailable or clearly
unwarranted;
(C) the specific class of cases consists of ones that
are highly repetitive and present substantially
similar fact scenarios; and
(D) the cases do not involve an offense that has
been designated by the Attorney General as
a "crime of violence."219
The practice of fast-tracking began along the southwest bor-
der where certain drug or "alien" smuggling crimes and recidi-
vist unlawful reentry crimes had a high incidence of
prosecution.220 Initially, the practice was only authorized to ex-
peditiously dispose of criminal cases when the defendant en-
gaged in recidivist illegal reentry with "prior serious criminal
conviction or a significant history of immigration apprehensions
and removals."22, Alternatively, fast-tracking could be utilized
in "alien" or drug smuggling sentencing after a finding of a fel-
ony conviction or an "aggravated felony." Noteworthy in the re-
cidivist cases is that the defendant has already been ordered
removed from the United States, presumably pursuant to an ad-
ministrative procedure delineated in the INA. So the hearing
strictly functions as a criminal hearing and a reinstatement of
the prior order of removal. With respect to the drug and alien
smuggling cases, it is important to note that the conviction will
render the defendants "aggravated felons" under the INA,
thereby sharply curtailing the right to relief from removal in an
immigration proceeding.222
219 Id.
220 PROTECT Act U.S.S.C. Hearings, supra note 204, at 3.
221 Id.
222 See I.N.A. § 101(a)(43) ("The term 'aggravated felony' means- (B) illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance, (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),
including a drug trafficking crime, (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)
... (N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of
this title (relating to alien smuggling).").
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What is striking about the use of fast-tracking against the
Postville detainees is that the vast majority of detainees were
neither recidivist immigration violators nor convicted of aggra-
vated felonies. Fast-track proceedings were never contemplated
to include the type of prosecutions that occurred in Postville.
When the United States Attorney argued the Attorney Gen-
eral's proposition for fast-tracking to the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, he specifically advised that the DOJ would use
careful discretion to prevent against broad or arbitrary use of
the program.223 Far from the intent behind the fast-track pro-
gram, it appears that in Postville, fast-tracking facilitated the
abridgement of the rights of undocumented laborers who had a
right to have their cases heard in criminal proceedings (or at
least execute their own properly advised plea agreements) and
the right to a separate, procedurally protected hearing on their
immigration case.
As the Ashcroft Memorandum articulates, the USAO must
provide a detailed explanation of why the criteria mentioned
above were satisfied with respect to such offenses. What was the
USAO's justification for fast-tracking the Agriprocessors work-
ers in Postville? Was the district confronting a persistent or
highly repetitive and exceptionally large number of a specific
class of offenses as required by the Ashcroft Memorandum?
Moreover, rather than a downward departure in sentencing, the
USAO appears to have utilized charge bargaining to justify the
fast-track program; but was the charge bargaining really made in
good faith?
In the experience of a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, the use
of fast-track plea bargaining has historically been limited to
those charged with the most serious, readily provable offenses
223 PROTECTAct U.S.S.C. Hearings, supra note 205, at 2 ("Nonetheless, we
recognize that there is reason for some concern about these programs, both
in terms of their expansion beyond immigration and the other types of cases
that create an extraordinary burden on the southwest border, and also in
relation to sentencing disparities that result from them.").
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under well-settled law.224 The use of well-settled statutes allows
the government and defendant's attorney to negotiate an even
exchange. Namely, the defendant receives a lesser charge or
sentence and the prosecution obtains expediency. The charging
statute invoked by the USAO in Postville, however, was neither
old nor well-settled. In Postville, the USAO threatened to prose-
cute under the federal aggravated identity theft statute.225 That
statute, implemented in July of 2004, provides a mandatory two
year sentence and requires a "knowing" violation.226 At the time
of the Postville proceedings, the proof required to sustain this
charge was not well-settled law. At issue among the split in the
circuits was whether or not the "knowingly" requirement ex-
tends through the charge, requiring the government to show
that the defendant knew that the identification he used be-
longed to another person.227 The Circuit split on this very issue
has become so onerous that the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to settle the issue on October 20, 2008.228
While the Eighth Circuit case law may have supported the
threat of aggravated felony charges at the time of the Postville
proceedings, 229 it is questionable whether the USAO really ac-
ted in good faith by employing charges to which the provability
remains highly contested.
224 Telephone Interview with Ricardo Meza, Midwest Regional Counsel,
MALDEF (Jan. 9, 2009); see also Ricardo Meza, MALDEF, Panel Presenta-
tion at DePaul University College of Law Vincentian Conference, Immigra-
tion Raids, Due Process and the Separation of Powers: Implications from
Postville and Beyond - Role of the U.S. Attorney's Office (Nov. 18, 2008),
video presentation [hereinafter Meza, Panel Presentation], available at http://
www.illinoislegaladvocate.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Home.dspContent&
contentlD=6569.
225 Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting, supra note 3, at 2, 5, 9-10.
226 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)
(2004).
227 Meza, Panel Presentation, supra note 224.
228 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 274 Fed. Appx. 501 (8th Cir. 2008) (cert.
granted Oct. 8, 2008, No. 08-108).
229 Id. at 502.
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On December 19, 2008, the Office of the Director with the
Executive Office for the United States Attorney issued a memo-
randum to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts indicating that the USAO has been improperly charging
felony identify theft under the Identification Fraud Statute.230
The memo indicates "some [USAOs] have charged violations
[of the identity fraud statute] as felonies .... [S]ome offenses
charged ... were incorrectly designated as felonies, and errone-
ous sentences may have been imposed in these cases." 231 Of crit-
ical importance to the Postville context, the memo notes that a
conviction under the aggravated identity theft statute "requires
the commission of an underlying 'felony' offense. Where the un-
derlying 'felony' specified in the charging document was actually
a misdemeanor violation . . . the conviction is erroneous." 232
This memo clearly indicates that simple possession crimes under
the identification theft statute are not felony offenses. Had this
memo been released prior to the Postville raid, the USAO
would have been strictly precluded from threatening the
Postville detainees with a two year sentence for aggravated iden-
tity theft. A mere seven months after the Postville proceedings
were concluded, the USAO itself acknowledged that it was im-
proper to threaten the use of aggravated identity theft to coerce
the Postville detainees into pleading guilty under the fast-track
system.
Taken as a whole, it seems that the fast-tracking process was
not employed to save government resources (the direct cost of
the Postville raid to the people is in excess of $10 million),233 but
rather, in a comprehensive failure to protect the integrity of our
judicial system, the government employed this discretionary tac-
230 Memorandum from James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts on Prosecution of Fraudulent Document Posses-
sion Crimes Under the Identification Fraud Statute (Jan. 22, 2009) (on file
with DePaul Journal for Social Justice).
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Camayd-Freixas, Raids, supra note 6, at 2.
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tic to coerce guilty pleas and removal orders - thereby boosting
their funding numbers - while circumventing the individuals'
rights to due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Looking back, Postville begins to look like a comprehensive
failure on the part of this great "nation of laws." A domestic
police agency with an over-inflated budget teamed up with over-
zealous prosecution and failed our nation of immigrants. Rather
than protecting the individuals being subjected to inhumane and
illegal labor conditions, the Department of Homeland Security
arrested them. The Department of Justice rapidly prosecuted
the migrant workers by bringing questionable charges to coerce
faster pleas. Most shockingly, perhaps, the federal judiciary,
rather than preserving due process, judicial integrity and impar-
tiality, facilitated the Executive's cause by sitting as federal
judges in trailers in Iowa. In the process, the federal district
court convicted and deported hundreds of Mexicans,
Guatemalans and Ukrainians in violation of the most basic prin-
ciples of the separation of powers and in violation of interna-
tional and domestic laws against the repatriation of those facing
persecution and torture. And the court-appointed attorneys -
the officers of the court - never made mention that the entire
process simply abandoned the rule of law.
The Postville raid represents more than just the tragedy of the
separation of families and the economic devastation of a rural
community. Its significance should resonate regardless of any
ideological stance on immigration law and policy. The Postville
proceedings represent what an imbalance of power can look like
when one branch of the government proceeds unchecked. Most
importantly, the Postville proceedings should compel the legisla-
tive branch to make the appropriate amendments to the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act by repealing INA § 238 in order to
prevent this usurpation of Congressional intent from harming
others in the future.
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